Custer, Part 4: Reno's Charge
Armies have used cavalry since man first learned to tame and ride a horse. The tactics pretty much stayed the same for most of the weapons as they evolved over the centuries. From mounted swordsmen, to archers, to light cavalry with pikes, and heavy cavalry with lances the underlying tactic was a slashing attack designed to breakup enemy infantry. Once a battle was engaged, cavalry would dash through the enemy’s infantry formations, hacking and stabbing their way through the lines and back. Eventually they would dismount and engage on foot.
These tactics carried through to the Civil War. But weapons evolution during that period saw a radical change. The advent of the firearm did little to affect these tactics through the American Revolution, as firearms were at that time single shot muzzleloaders. But the British began to issue their cavalry short barreled guns called dragoons. They modified their tactics to have the cavalry armed with these weapons to dismount and fire into the infantry, with deadly effect. These troops became known as Dragoons.
As weapons evolution continued, so did the need to change cavalry tactics. The major defense against cavalry for modern armies was artillery. In the Crimean war, the last great cavalry charge, that of the British Light Brigade was decimated by Russian artillery. But the development of cylindrical weapons systems (revolvers) and the advent of the cartridge and Minnie ball were the biggest developments to change the face of battle and make the cavalry all but obsolete.
With the Minnie ball, infantry became far more accurate than they were with smooth bore muskets. A Minnie ball was a conical shaped projectile with a hollow pit at the back, slightly smaller than the rifled bore it was pushed down. When the black powder charge it was packed against was ignited, the pressure built up, causing the hollowed out pit to expand, which forced the lead projectile to grip the rifled groves of the barrel as it was expelled. This resulted in a spin, which gave the projectile a straighter more accurate flight. (Think spinning football thrown downfield). The paper cartridge allowed infantry to fire up to 5 volleys of accurate fire at charging cavalry rather than one or two inaccurate volleys of smooth bores. As casualty rates went up, tactics had to change.
But the shift in tactics had the effect of shifting emphasis on army expenditures. It was far cheaper to outfit an infantry soldier than it was a cavalry soldier. Cavalry were still issued swords, or rather the lighter smaller sabers, in addition to horse, saddle and tack. Add in the cost of feeding and maintaining the horse heard, and the inevitable shrinking size of cavalry corps was the result.
Where once the cavalry was a force that could be used effectively to turn a battle of sword and arrows, they were now relegated to infantry screening, scouting, and on occasion, deep territorial raids. Cavalry doctrine taught at West Point was for cavalry to ride into the field, dismount, and engage. The mechanics of this required every 4 th man to hold the mounts of the other 3 men while they formed the skirmish line. The effect of this was that the company of usually 80 men was reduced by 25%, with the line made up of only 60 men.
One Confederate General changed all that. Lt General Nathan Bedford Forrest, often described as the greatest cavalry man in the history of the US, changed the concept of cavalry to that of mounted infantry. He did that by changing two tactics.
Instead of using cavalry to screen and support slow moving infantry forces marching on foot, he used the horses to get the cavalry up close and engaged first. The tactic of reducing the line by one quarter while a soldier held 3 other’s mounts was done away with. He directed his cavalrymen to find a tree and tie their horses to it, allowing ALL men to engage. In cases where they could not secure their horses, the line would fire volleys until ready to reload. But as they were reloading, the 4 th man would then assume the line and the volleys would continue.
These tactics worked to great success for Forrest. In fact, they helped turn the battle in several engagements.
Forrest was not a West Point graduate. His tactics, although effective, were not fully accepted. What was accepted, and became the norm for the western expansion was the concept of mounted infantry. Cavalry was employed as fast moving infantry. But the tactic of reducing the force by ¼ while a soldier held mounts was still used.
It should be noted at this point that in the west there were both cavalry AND mounted infantry. That is, many infantry units also rode horses as a matter of necessity. Unit designations as Infantry or Cavalry were not the only difference. Armament was different between the two. Cavalry were still issued sabers, where Infantry were issued bayonets. Cavalry were issued the shorter barreled carbine, where infantry were issued long barreled rifles. And each cavalry trooper was issued a pistol, when available. If not available, the troopers could supply their own pistols.
Cavalry charges were still used in the west as a successful tactic. Successful in that they accomplished their intention of unnerving and breaking an enemy. It helped that the tactic was used when charging through an Indian village, unnerving women and children, which many times led to the men of the village surrendering. But understand, charging and shooting a rifle with any accuracy is pure Hollywood.
The US Army 7 th Cavalry rode into the Little Bighorn Valley that early afternoon of June 25 th armed with Colt Single Action Army revolvers, and the Springfield 45/55 carbine Model 1873. The Model 1873 was a trap-door single shot rifle accurate to about 600 yards. (By contrast, the Army Infantry at the time carried the Model 1873 Rifle in 45/70, accurate out to almost 1000 yards.) No sabers made this trip. Not even with the officers. This is another thing Hollywood gets wrong.
This is how the troopers of Companies A, G and M were armed as they crossed the Little Bighorn and followed Major Reno north to engage the Sioux at the southern end of the village. Traveling in a column of two, they galloped for about a half mile before breaking up into a four-man column, and accelerating to a dead run. Many of the troopers thought this was going to be a charge. And it should have been.
Sitting Bull has said on many occasions that he initially thought they were beaten from the beginning. When the column appeared galloping around a bend in the Little Bighorn river, the Sioux who first glimpsed the troopers were mortified. Here was a force of heavily armed troopers bearing down on their village, and they were caught completely by surprise. But then, something happened. The soldiers stopped.
Reno…was a drunk. He could always be counted on to have a bottle or a flask on him where ever he was. This wasn’t all that uncommon at the time. Many of the soldiers and Officers had alcohol on them. But none of them were drinking from the bottle in clear view of their men when they crossed the river, and at a full gallop up the valley. Reno even passed the bottle to his adjutant as they rode on.
(Map: Courtesy of The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.)
So when the village came into view, he shocked the entire corps when he hollered for a Halt and a dismount. The soldiers tried to stop. A few couldn’t, or didn’t hear. They went galloping on into the village, never to be seen again.
The rest of the battalion dismounted and formed a skirmish line. The horse handlers lead the 140 or so horses off into the wooded area to the east, into a clearing away from the line.
There was no parley. There was no attempt to communicate. Reno ordered, and the men opened fire on the village.
The first few volleys succeeded in killing several women and children. Most of the warriors had ridden off that morning on a buffalo hunt and were just now beginning to trickle back into the villages. This means that Reno’s battalion was facing mostly non-combatants. And at first they were effective in wreaking havoc on the village. Many of the Indians interviewed later, including Sitting Bull have said that Reno could have succeeded in bringing the village to its knees. Sitting Bull, who at the time was about 800 yards deep in the village, testified that had Reno not dismounted, and charged through the village, the outcome may very well have been different. Indeed, he was ready, when the soldiers were first spotted, to talk truce and work out details for returning his people to the res.
But Reno didn’t charge. And when the troopers realized that they were not hitting any targets that were actually too far away, they began to shoot high, trying to lob their rounds into the village.
The Indians were initially confused. Panic set in as women and children rushed deeper into the safety of the village and the few warriors present rallied to meet the threat. They were able to make one large charge at the troopers line, but this was repulsed.
Crazy Horse, returning from the hunt, heard the commotion and the rifle fire. He gathered about 150 warriors at the pony herd and worked their way to the left flank of the troopers. Here he told his warriors to wait until the soldier’s guns were hot. Crazy Horse knew that the weapons of the cavalry had a bad habit of jamming when hot. Cartridges of that time were copper, not brass. And a hot chamber would cause them to expand, and not eject properly. A soldier would have to dig the cartridge out with a knife at that point.
Soon, Crazy Horse saw what he was waiting for. The level of fire began to reduce, and soldiers were frantically digging at the actions of their rifles. Seeing this he attacked. With great success. The line began to collapse.
Panic soon shifted from the Indian village to Reno’s battalion. They fell back and tried to form a second line. But this line lasted for a short time, and the battalion began to fall apart. Some of the Officers rallied their men to a third skirmish line just in front of where the horses were being tended. But soon, Reno had had enough.
He called for a retreat, and bolted for his horse. The soldiers mounted up, and Reno turned to the Arikara scout Bloody Knife. In sign language, he asked if the scout knew what the Indians were doing, and where they would go. This was a rather incredulous question. The Indians were working their way through the timber towards the troopers. There was a lull in the firing. Then suddenly, from about 50 yards, a volley of fire erupted. Bloody Knife was hit in the back of the head, and brain matter and blood splattered all over Reno. That unnerved him. Troopers testified later that he was so confused and panicked at this point that he called “Mount!, Dismount! Mount!” before finally galloping off to recross the river.
At that point, it was a mad dash to horses, the river, and the relatively safety of a tall hill. Many of the troopers didn’t make it. Some hid out in the trees and bushes near the banks. Others were quickly overcome by the pursuing warriors.
Out of 130 troopers, only 80 made it to the relative if not fragile safety of the hilltop with Reno. As they stopped and regrouped, from the east they saw a column of soldiers riding hard towards them. At first the troopers thought it was Custer’s battalion coming to their rescue. Instead, leading the column, Captain Benteen rode up to Major Reno and asked “Where’s Custer?”
Tags
Who is online
423 visitors
Reno, was a drunken pussy. My opinion of course. I welcome yours.
I think you can add idiot as well.
As well as coward.
Yes, you are right Raven Wing.
I didn't even this the article on the FP. Did find it on the NV Columnist side.
Good review of the situation.
I think that killing women and children is more accurate.
I doubt that Crazy Horse or Gal among others would have surrendered no matter what happened with Reno charge.
I tend to agree with you on him being a drunk and pussy. It's easy to attack a village of women and children, not so easy to fight the warriors.
The truth is, Gal's wife and daughters were killed in this charge by Reno.
Yes, sad as it is, thus the comment that Gal would never surrender.
I agree. From what I have read about their history they would not have surrendered under any circumstances.
Kavika, which weapons would the warriors have had here?
The Indians had a mixture but many Henry repeating .44 cal and Sharps .50 cal...With a mixture of other rifles and of course bows and arrow which they used at close range using them in an arching fashion while staying behind cover, dave.
That is a potent set of options. The Henry would be a very good, close in rifle while the bow and arrow would give the added dimension of dropping in on targets.
When I was very young my dad had a 45-70 Sharps trap door. At some point he had to sell it and his 32-20 Winchester to pay some bills. Back in 1876, The 45-70 and 45-110 could have been very effective long range weapons.
Sorry, I meant the .50. I got side tracked by the .45s which were longer range rifles.
I'll be talking about Indian weaponry in a future article. It plays a very important part in finding the truth of what happened to Custer.
That should be an interesting article.
They also had an estimated 200 Winchester lever actions. And used them to good effect at both Reno Hill and Keogh's last stand....
I'm really enjoying this series. Look forward to the next installment.
Allow me to bring some perspective at this point. Reno demanded an investigation to clear his name after the battle. This happened two years later.
A lot of criticism has been placed on him for his actions at the beginning. But as the saying goes, Hind sight is 20/20.
Reno had no idea how big the village was at that moment. Frankly, Custer had no clue how big it was until well after he had sent Reno off on his attack. So, Reno was attacking an unknown force.
Also, Reno was under the impression that Custer was attacking from the North as he began his attack. It was a good 30-45 minutes between the time they split up and Reno attacked. Reno's orders were to draw the warriors to him, as Custer attacked from the other direction. Reno made it clear in the hearings that stopping and dismounting was the only way to draw the warriors to him. Had he continued to charge through the village, they would have been scattered. In reality, as big as the village was, it's likely that Reno and his men would have met the same fate as Custer.
Which brings me to Sitting Bull's statements about almost getting beaten. Many have dismissed this as simply saying what people want to hear. Perhaps he makes these statements to lessen the impact of his victory.
Yes he was attacking an unknown force, in his (Reno's) initial after action report he stated that after cresting a small rise when moving up the valley his unit began receiving accurate hostile fire. This was his basis for dismounting and taking up not so much as a defensive position, but like you say forming the block where the enemy could see him and come to him. What he actually perceived was warning shots from scouts who were placed in position to warn the village at the approach of any force not recognized.
Reno from his position still could not ascertain the actual size of the village but did appreciate that it was the largest he had ever seen and much larger than what they saw when they were way down the valley.
Crazy Horses men didn't actually hold their fire either. They maintained sufficient fire to make Reno think that the force was stronger than it actually was. The Indians weren't stupid, they understood tactics better than any general gave them credit for. Crazy Horse saw them start to fall back to the tree line and saw his opportunity. sent a group east across the valley to get into position to create a crossfire situation once the troopers took cover amongst the trees. Of course CH knew what they were going to do once they reached the trees.
The troopers were going to take vertical firing stances using the trees as both firing supports and shields.
Once they got into position and established their defensive line, that is when the Indians opened fire from the north and CH's braves opened up from the west. Reno's position soon became untenable....
I also believe that If Reno had continued his charge, he would have met the same fate as Custer.
Reno was not an experienced Calvary officer, the tactics he understood were the tactics as applied by Custer.
Jeb Stuart would not have made the same mistake that Custer did. Stuart would not have put his second in command in such a position.
As it was, Reno save a good chunk of his command after taking severe casualties, and when Benteen showed up looking for Custer, he used the two artillery batteries left behind with the wagon train to defend his position. While Benteen went on a jaunt to find Custer.
Reno was a fool and a drunk, of that there is no doubt, but he was smart enough to save his command in the face of superior tactics, where many would have failed and been slaughtered.
A coward? I don't know about that. Once he went on his mission it was up to him how he carried out his orders and his orders were to draw the warriors out so Custer could hit them from behind... He tried. once he got a good look at the size of that village I think he realized that standard tactics were out of the question. So he went as far as confirming that he got their attention and drew their attack, he felt that he accomplished his mission.
At that point he had no further mission and simply had to survive....
Hard to backseat quarterback Reno. He carried out his orders and advanced up the valley, once he saw that his mission was impossible he did what he could and saved himself and his troopers from assured annihilation.
I also believe that Sitting Bull was playing to the interviewers with his statements. They knew that they could not say on the little bighorn. There were three federal armies marching on them from three directions with artillery and in two days there would be no escape. I do believe in reading the SB interviews what SB was talking about was their understanding of this and what they would have to do if they allowed themselves to be trapped.
They understood that their one chance of escape was up the ravine to the southwest and were making plans to do just that the next day. the hunting parties were out gathering food for the trip. They attacked Custer cause if Custer invested the high ground south behind the Village, tactically the battle was over before it had begun. There would be no escape from the Little Bighorn.
This is what Custer's indian Scouts were telling him, and he ignored looking for glory.
The Indians were surprisingly good tacticians, which was a surprise for most generals of the day.
NWM, I can argue nothing with your post except one thing: There was no artillery with Benteen. In fact, there was no artillery at all with the 7th on this march.
Three .50 Cal Gatling Guns of the 20th Infantry were at Fort Lincoln and were to take part in Gen Terry's Dakota Column. But there was concern that they would impede Custer's pursuit of the Indians. They were instead assigned to Col Gibbon's Montana column.
There is differing information on those artillery batteries. some historians report that some troopers actually stted that Custer argued with Terry about the batteries giving the usual arguments regarding such, but they claim that they were taken anyway at the direct order of Terry. but then Terry's orders to Custer were to find them and make sure they didn't get away.....
The artillery was essential to the final part of that order. also given the length of time it took Custer to get where he was after leaving Fort Lincoln and by the route he took leans towards him having it with him.
the artillery question is a difficult one cause there is evidence either way, so no one is sure positive if it was there. I personally lean towards the idea that he had it. Some of the after action reports from Benteen's units make no sense unless the artillery was actually there. That's kinda the key for me, I'll believe the trooper in the field long before I will believe a sanitized record by the officers.
The guns DID travel with the army when it left Fort Lincoln. In fact, When Reno lead a scouting march from the Powder River across to the Rosebud river, he had one of the guns with him, and it proved entirely too cumbersome to move across the terrain with any speed. Reno's scouting trip, with half of the 7th did find the Indian trail. When he reported back to Terry and the rest of the Army (The Montana Column), Custer tore him a new asshole for not following and attacking when he knew where they were. But Reno didn't know where they were. He only knew where they were not. Gibbon's had discovered them on the Rosebud, and also chose not to attack, but to move further east to meet up with Terry. It was at this point, where the Yellowstone River and the Rosebud River meet, in his cabin on the Far West, Terry altered his plans.
Gibbons and Terry would follow the Yellowstone on the Far West until it met the Bighorn River. They would travel down the Bighorn to the Little Bighorn, where most of the scouts predicted the Indians to be. Custer was to march south, along the Rosebud, following the Indian trail. His orders were to march almost to the Wyoming border, before turning North West towards the Little Bighorn, and march up that river. In this way, Terry expected to catch the Indians between the two columns.
For this reason, knowing that Reno had trouble with just one gun, Custer declined to take any of the guns on hi march. He was in a hurry. He didn't want to get bogged down.
I base this on all the research I've done, including the official Army records of the movement of the 20th with General Terry in that campaign.
Can you point me in the right direction, cause that is one of the answers I've been looking for now for quite a while.
The answer to the question "What really happened to the artillery"
(i'm always up for more info)
Here's an online source.
I also rely on "The Last Stand" by Nathaniel Philbrick. I have that book in hardcover. If you have a kindle, I highly recommend it. You'll understand when in about 2 more articles.
Another source I've used is " Son of the Morning Star " by Evan S. Connell. Now this book does a great job of putting the battle in perspective of what led up to it, and the history of the players. But, his account of the actual battle should be taken with a grain of salt. Again, you'll understand in my future articles.
That is a gorgeous pic of a 1" gatling gun.... I wish there were some of those still in existence.... (made the much more common .50 cal standard gatling look tame by comparison) Yeah they were heavy pieces, weighed more than a similar sized hotchkiss gun. Currently have those two books on order, hardback of course to add to my collection....
Thank you...
This background information helps with the overall picture, Yet it does not explain the poor tactical approach of Custer and Reno.
If I understood correctly a 3 pronged pincer was in the making. There was no good reason to be in a situation of attacking an unknown force in this situation. Time was on Custer's side. He had time to scout the unknown force. Even coordinate with the other 2 prongs of the pincer. Judging from the little bit of information, Custer's arrogance and greed for glory, over ruled any tactical training he had.
Just on the face of it, that is how it looks.
Yes there were three federal forces closing on the Little Bighorn, Gen. Terry (with Custer attached) from Fort Lincoln in the Northeast (dakotas), Col. Gibbons from Fort Ellis in the West (montana) and Gen. Crooke from Fort Fetterman in the South. (wyoming) General Terry in overall command.
Custer and the 7th cavalry was the Striking arm of General Terry's western division field command. What is even more interesting than the artillery question was that Terry also offered Custer the entire 2nd Cavalry as part of his scouting expedition which he also strongly refused. (this would have given Custer a force almost as large as General Crookes)
Custer was detached from Terry and moved south then east towards the rosebud looking for contact with a large Indian force known to be gathering somewhere in the upper Missouri basin. His orders were to find, report back and track. NOT attack, Custer knew this before hand and in rejecting the addition of the 2nd cavalry to his command was heard to say that the 7th cavalry regiment was strong enough to handle any Indian force all by itself.
I have always wondered if he would have liked to take that statement back......
i am sure he had a few minutes to consider that.
Thanks for the additional information.
Two things Custer's arrogant and egotistical mental attitude underestimated;
First, the true capabilities, determination and desperation of the Indians they were bent on annihilating
Second, he exceedingly over estimated his own knowledge of the terrain and the capabilities of his own men.
These and many other mistakes due to his pompous attitude led to his defeat at the Big Horn battle.
Just my take on it.
There have been several people who were in attendance of the final meeting of Custer, Gibbons, and Terry (and a few others) where Custer was given his orders from Terry. Both Terry and Gibbons would state officially for the record that Custer was never ordered to attack the Indians on his own. This makes history reflect that Custer disobeyed his orders when he attacked.
But this is not true. Terry has made it clear in his testimony that he never authorized Custer to attack, but what is missing is a direct order NOT to attack. And this is where modern day conflicts with Army doctrine of the 1800's.
It was acceptable in the Army at that time to disobey an order, IF you were successful. Custer in fact disobeyed his orders at Gettysburg during the Civil War, but was successful, and many say won that battle for the Union in doing so.
So where does that put us with Custer and Terry? Terry, Gibbons, Col. Robert Hughes (Terry's aide) and James Brisbin (Gibbon's Cavalry commander) all agreed later that if Custer had followed the original plan they would have prevailed. But these are all career soldiers. Fred Gerard, the scout interpreter has testified that Terry told Custer that if he found the Indians, to not do as Reno had done, but to attack if he thought he could whip them.
So, lacking an official order NOT to attack, Custer, exercising his field commander's prerogative, veered from his original path to follow the Indian path when it turned west.
I for one do not hold that Custer disobeyed an order not to attack. I will get into my thoughts on Custer and this action in the final article.
Patiently waiting.... I love these types of discussions.....
Trust me man. Too many people use Hollywood as a history teacher. And in many cases, they're dead wrong.
In MOST cases they are dead wrong.
I absolutely agree with both of you 100%. It takes a lot of reading and research to get to the truth. Especially about things like battles where you can have conflicting information even from two people who participated in it within the same unit or fighting position.
And some truths will never reveal themselves.....
I still encounter people who believe that scene in "They died with their boots on" Custer (Errol Flynn) the last man standing in front of the flag and guidon with two empty revolvers facing down the charging Crazy Horse.....
What a crock....
Are you talking about Custer and Reno? Or Terry, Gibbons, and Crooke?
IN the big picture, it was Terry from the East, Gibbons from the West, and Crooke from the South. Crooke was engaged by the Indians the battle of the Rosebud on June 17th. As a result, he turned back and marched back into Wyoming. He reported this by courier to Fort Fetterman, which was in turn reported to Gen Sheridan in Chicago. BUT Gibbons and Terry had no idea they had engaged and withdrawn.
Gibbon's scouts had discovered the large Indian village June 7th on the Rosebud River. But rather than attack, he continued on to the East following the Yellowstone River, until he met with Terry's column.
What this means is that by June 17th, the 3 pronged overall assault had already fallen apart.
Alright, thank you for the added information again. Interesting. I can understand Crooke breaking off, What were the communications options then? Scout and Courier? I would think Gibbons and Terry maintaining contact while coordinating with Custer would be important, especially in light of Crookes departure (probably also not realized by Terry and Gibbons at the time? ).
Communications appears to be an achilles heal.
I look forward to your next article, not for the outcome though. Certainly a point in time when life gets worse for the Indians. Kind of reminds me of the situation between the Scots and English.
I would have loved to have spoken to Chief Joe Medicine Crow. Anthropologist, historian, author and the last Living War Chief of the Crow Nation. Also a WWII veteran, Bronze Star recipient and the last living person with direct knowledge of the Battle of Greasy Grass.
He was the interpreter for White Man Runs Him, one of the Crow scouts at the battle, also his great uncle. Medicine Crow spoke and had direct knowledge of four of the six Crow scouts. His father was the boyhood friend of Chief Plenty Coups. Medicine Crow walked on in 2016 at 102 years old.
Deep story (obituary).
I hope Chief Joe Medicine Crows memory remains preserved. In doing so, those who he knew will also be preserved.
Being as Chief Joe Medicine Crow was ever a consultant for the Big Horn battle scene in the movie "Little Big Man" in any way since he had first and knowledge of the event.
He led a very full life and and achieved many accomplishments in his long life. A highly honored and decorated WarII Warrior, as well as his many other great contributions to his Tribe, Native Americans and the world in general. The legacy he leaves behind will always be his bright star in Father Sky.
RIP Chief Joe Medicine Crow.
nv-wa-do-hi-ya-dv (Peace)
If I remember correctly there is a reenactment every year and Medicine Crow wrote the script for it.
Thanks for for the additional information, very interesting that he was able to bring first hand experience to the re-enactment.
Thanks, Bruce for this fabulous article!
You're welcome Dowser. Stay tuned, we're getting to the good parts!
Something to look forward to!
So, where are the additional articles (he asked with baited breath) ????????