Colombia's lessons for open borders migration
By: The Telegraph
Wake the hell up!!
S E E D E D C O N T E N T
"To speak of migration is to speak of destitution, street dwellers, [un]employment, and drug trafficking…We have been forced to bear the cost and have neither the funds, capacity nor personnel to deal with [mass] migration". These were not the words of former president Donald Trump; rather, the speaker was 2023 mayoral candidate Martin Rojas (no relation) for the city of Bucaramanga, Colombia.
Located near the border with Venezuela, Rojas was referring to the unprecedented wave of Venezuelan migrants that has engulfed both Colombia and much of the Western Hemisphere in recent years. Since 2016, an estimated 8 million people have fled crisis-stricken Venezuela as the nation continues to grapple with prolonged economic collapse, violence and political persecution by the Maduro regime. Of those, around 3 million are now thought to reside within neighboring Colombia - by far the country that has borne the brunt of the ongoing migration crisis.
Over time, the marked increase in immigration has caused fears over crime and wage suppression to jump to the forefront of everyday concerns throughout the country. The Colombian case is especially illustrative for its insights into a rather simple truth: mass, uncontrolled immigration almost always breeds animosity towards migrants among native populations. Ask any mainstream economist, libertarian or upper class progressive in Colombia their opinion on immigration and they are likely to recite many of the same maxims as their North American counterparts: immigrants commit crime at lower rates than natives, increased immigration leads to higher economic growth.
Ask ordinary Colombians on the topic, however and the dichotomy between elite and public opinion is rather stark. I spoke with Carmela, a retail worker near Bogota's historic center who lamented the hardship faced by those fleeing Venezuela but nonetheless took a hardline against immigration: "People in this country get killed everyday and they just let in more criminals. It has to stop". In Medellin, a patrolman I spoke with from the National Police - a working class profession in Colombia - put it succinctly: "What do you expect? They come here with nothing and turn to crime. Many are often already affiliated to violent groups like the Tren de Aragua and come here because there's more to pillage than in Venezuela".
It's worth noting that anti-immigration sentiment in Colombia is not a uniquely Right-wing phenomenon. In 2021, the center-Left mayor of Bogota, Claudia Lopez provoked an outcry from traditional media and human rights groups after she floated the creation of a special police unit that would investigate crimes committed by migrants.
And yet, the data shows that pro-immigration critics are correct that Venezuelan migrants commit crimes at lower rates than native Colombians - though the exact figure is often in dispute. Why then are Colombians so prone to associating migrants with crime? The very simple explanation is that Colombians - like Americans - resent the presence of foreign criminals that otherwise would not be on Colombian - or US - soil. Similarly, that most migrants commit crimes at lower rates than natives does not change the reality that the total number of criminals within a given country increases as a result of unrestricted immigration.
Then there's the equally polemical issue of wage suppression via migrant labour. 'Immigration is good for the economy' or so mainstream economists so often tell us. It is, of course, a mathematical certainty that increased immigration leads to higher economic growth. By increasing the labour pool as well as the total number of consumers within a given country, GDP growth necessarily increases. The proper question to ask, however, is whether mass, irregular immigration benefits native workers as a whole. On this question, public opinion is likewise resounding. Oxfam found that around 70 per cent of Colombians, Ecuadorians and Peruvians favored stricter immigration restrictions and believed that mass migration led to lower salaries and worse working conditions.
Why might this be? As large numbers of precarious, low-skill workers enter the labour pool, wages inevitably decline. This is compounded in countries where informal labour is the norm and immigrant workers are willing to work longer hours and for less pay than natives. In Colombia, 56 per cent of workers are employed in the informal economy with around 80 per cent of Venezuelan workers operating under a verbal employment contract. Unsurprisingly, Venezuelan migrants also work significantly longer hours and earn just $65 of every $100 pesos earned by native workers.
In 2022, an IMF report on the impact of Venezuelan migration in Latin America noted the following: "As most migrants find a job, total employment increases, and real wages decline. Lower real wages discourage the participation of some domestic workers in the labour market, while overall unemployment increases slightly as the unemployment rate of migrants exceeds that of the domestic workers…For firms, lower real wages result in lower production costs and higher profits."
On the ground in Colombia, the IMF's findings speak for themselves. I interviewed Gustavo, a white collar worker and hotel owner from Medellin - who spoke candidly of his use of labour arbitrage via migrant workers. "What's great about so many migrants coming through here is that you can always find a Venezuelan that's willing to work for half the rate of any local. I saved millions [of Colombian pesos] on the terrace you see there".
Sure enough, in 2024 in Bogota, Jhon Jairo, a construction worker in the upscale neighborhood of Chapinero, gave me a much less benign account of increased competition with migrant workers. "You can't imagine the amount of business I've lost to Venezuelans. You see us here working on this road and we're all Colombian but our contract is with the city. I used to do all manner of work on the side for businesses and homeowners. Nowadays, they hire Venezuelans". When I followed up on this point, Jhon clarified that the latter work was informal where migrants grossly outcompete natives. Indeed, around 84 per cent of migrants in Colombia work in the construction and service sectors.
The great irony is that, until recently, Venezuela was the chief destination of Colombian migrants. Prior to the 2010s, over a million Colombians settled in Venezuela - many of them fleeing drug violence and armed conflict. Like Venezuelans migrants today, Colombian migrants in Venezuela were similarly associated with crime and wage suppression. Accordingly, the respective struggles and inexorable linkages between both countries are not lost on either group - both of which acknowledge a shared kinship.
During the early years of the Venezuelan exodus, Colombians of all stripes expressed widespread solidarity with their Andean counterparts as many in border communities took to providing food and shelter for those fleeing violence and hyperinflation. In some cases, the crisis reunited families that had long lost contact across international borders. While in Bogota, I interviewed Jimena, a former office secretary from Cali who recalled a surprise visit by a pair of Venezuelan migrants claiming to be long lost relatives.
"Around seven or eight years ago, I remember my brother received a call from two strangers asking if we could pick them up from one of Cali's bus terminals. We had no idea who they were but they explained that years ago, I think during the 1970s, one of my mother's siblings left for Venezuela while she was still young. We didn't know what to think but his story checked out. My mother had a great number of siblings but recognized the name he mentioned. They were family."
Subsequently, the international community showered the Colombian government with praise for its response to the migration crisis. The center-Right and conservative administrations of Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) and Ivan Duque (2018-2022) promoted overt open border policies including allowing entry with expired passports and the regularisation of nearly all Venezuelan migrants.
The Right-wing Duque effectively neutered immigration enforcement via his policy of maximum pressure - in collaboration with the Trump administration - against Caracas. Having suspended relations with Caracas after 2019, deportations - mostly of criminals - were halted outright as the possibility of restricting work permits and permanent residence for migrants came into conflict with the government's rhetoric of solidarity with the victims of the Maduro regime. That same year, for the first time, a majority of Colombians (around 52 per cent) expressed their opposition to the entry of Venezuelan migrants. By 2022, the polling firm Invamer found that 64 per cent of Colombians had an unfavourable view of Venezuelan migrants and 68 per cent were against granting them permanent status.
Today, immigration restrictionism is increasingly prevalent across the political spectrum with multiple mayoral and gubernatorial candidates in last year's regional elections - such as the aforementioned Rojas - running on the issue. Of course, this has not stopped legacy and even independent media from denouncing virtually any critique of unrestricted immigration as xenophobic. Of particular interest was one Mauricio Tobon, an independent candidate for the governorship of Antioquia - Colombia's second most populous department and home of Medellin.
"During the 20th century, Venezuela embraced Antioquians…Today Antioquia embraces our Venezuelan brothers. I will work to strengthen our bonds of brotherhood for those who have come to raise families, promote entrepreneurship and work honestly and honorably. I will not tolerate Venezuelans who commit crimes in our department. Neither they nor any other criminal, whether foreign or domestic, will put the people of Antioquia in check." For these words, Tobon was excoriated in the press as propagating "xenophobia and disinformation".
Yet, the views of ordinary Colombians are broadly in line with those expressed by Tobon. Referring to the plight of both Colombian and Venezuelan migrants in decades past, Jimena noted the goodness of migrants - like her Venezuelan cousins - who came in search of better opportunities. Even then, she asserted a need for limits: "We embraced them (Venezuelans) just as they embraced us. But the country can only stand so much. Many of those coming now turn to a life of crime".
On this point, the inevitable response from proponents of immigration is again correct. The vast majority of Venezuelan migrants do not commit crimes and are themselves among the prime victims of organized crime in both countries. Regardless, the conclusion that Venezuelan migration is an overall net benefit for Colombians is misleading to say the least.
Lamentably, Venezuelan migrants have been increasingly subjected to genuine xenophobia on the part of native Colombians. In January, a local official in Bogota reported that migrants were issued death threats on the part of a so-called urban militia. The fact that Venezuelans lack meaningful cultural differences, however, speaks to the inevitability of anti-immigration sentiment in light of unchecked mass migration. For perspective, in 2016, around 54,000 Venezuelans were thought to reside on Colombian soil. A year later, that figure jumped to over 400,000. Today, the number exceeds 3 million.
None of this is to say that xenophobia and violence against migrants is justified. Rather, it points to the reality that unchecked migration entails significant costs for both natives and migrants. Ironically and in contrast to his conservative predecessor, the Leftist Gustavo Petro (2022-present) has promoted a policy of voluntary repatriation for Venezuelan migrants - though the net number of migrants that have returned to Venezuela remains low and migratory policy has otherwise remained unchained.
Just weeks ago, the foreign ministry unveiled a draft resolution advising migrants to present a valid passport and visa at a formal border crossing should they wish to legally enter the country. But after an outcry in the media, the administration reversed course noting the legitimate difficulty of acquiring a valid visa and passport in Venezuela.
The irony is that, beyond Colombia, the degree to which South American countries restrict entry to Venezuelans typically increases the farther one travels from the Bolivarian Republic. In Ecuador and Peru, authorities demand a plethora of valid documents in order to deter migrants while Chile has resorted to militarising its northern border in its efforts to crackdown on immigration. Most countries in the region aggressively deport undocumented Venezuelans - sometimes to neighboring countries depending on their point of entry and whether or not the government maintains diplomatic relations with the tyrannical Maduro regime.
Unsurprisingly, the politics of migration throughout South America have shifted in a decidedly restrictionist direction - in many, if not all cases, to the benefit of the political Right. Readers may well be tempted to dismiss comparisons between the migratory experiences of South American countries and those of North America or Europe. Particularly in the latter, debates over assimilation and the compatibility of migrants' social and political culture are more than justified depending on their countries of origin. This is a much less significant concern in both North and especially Latin America.
Yet, until recently, one could just as easily have mistaken the IMF's findings on immigration to Colombian with those of economists studying the effects of Mexican immigration to the United States during the 1990s. As Telegraph contributor Michael Lind has noted, as recently as 2006, the Nobel laureate Paul Krugman held that mass, unskilled immigration suppressed wages for native workers.
The fact that Colombians regard migrants who share the same language, religion and politics in much the same way as North American voters do, suggests that more is at play than the original sin of implicit prejudice and xenophobia. Policymakers from across the political spectrum would do well to recognise the legitimacy of voters' concerns with regards to immigration. To that end, in the UK, it's heartening that the rhetoric - if not necessarily the policy - of both the Labour and Conservative Parties acknowledge public opinion on the subject. This stands in sharp contrast to the US.
The sad reality in Latin America is that states such as Colombia quite literally lack the capacity to enact meaningful policy on immigration. Large swathes of the border between Colombia and Venezuela are rife with smuggling, drug trafficking, are not easily accessible by authorities and are almost entirely controlled by armed groups such as the Leftist National Liberation Army (ELN). This is similarly the case throughout much of the continent though not to the same extent (Chile's northern border with Bolivia and Peru stands out as comparatively easier to enforce).
Further, unlike the US, the overwhelmingly informal character of Latin American labour rules out any possibility of deterring migration via penalties for employers that hire irregular workers. There is, moreover, no indication that emigration from Venezuela is likely to fall for the foreseeable future regardless of whether Maduro leaves office.
To that end, it is difficult to fault Venezuelans for their efforts to flee a failed state - particularly those subjected to violence and persecution. At the same time, even Venezuelans do not have grounds for limitless asylum and must demonstrate credible threats to their livelihoods on the basis of race, religion, social group, or political opinion under asylum law.
Conversely, it's certainly true that, if anything, sanctions have helped Maduro consolidate power. On the other hand, additional or renewed sanctions relief is similarly unlikely to put a dent in the number of Venezuelans that choose to emigrate. In competent hands, it's also Washington's chief means of extracting productive concessions from Caracas to the benefit of the opposition.
At best, the most that countries like Colombia can do to reduce net migration is to enact stricter entry requirements or promote voluntary and/or mandatory repatriation. On the latter, Mexico's AMLO recently brokered an innovative repatriation policy between local and Venezuelan firms - offering migrants jobs and a stipend on the condition that they return to Venezuela. Both Colombia and Ecuador have expressed interest in the Mexican policy - though it remains a partial measure even in the most optimistic of scenarios.
Emigration from Venezuela will remain a more or less permanent fixture of immigration politics in Latin America for years to come - most of all in Colombia. This does not mean, however, that policymakers are correct to pursue laissez-faire inaction. It is a political imperative that Latin American governments establish concrete controls on immigration - however flawed. The lesson of the Colombian experience is that mass, unrestricted immigration necessarily leads to backlash in most any democratic society. Accordingly and at some point, the will of the people - whether in Colombia or elsewhere - ought to be heard.
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And right down that path we go.
Mass migration without assimilation is suicide. It's common sense that anyone slightly literare in history understands.
There's such a pervasive hatred for America and western culture in general among the progressives who serve as cultural gatekeepers that assimilation becomes impossible. The whole point of the successor ideology that replaced liberalism on the left is to break society apart rather than bind it together. It won't end well if it's not reversed.
The seed points out that a comparison between Columbia and the United States is really apples and oranges. Venezuelans don't have to assimilate into Columbian society because they already share language, culture, history, and even politics.
The Columbian government and United States government are making the same promises concerning the benefit of illegal immigration. But the Columbian government doesn't need to subsidize illegal and legal immigration because assimilation is not an issue. Private business in Columbia is essentially managing immigration; the Columbian government doesn't need to do anything.
The problem in the United States is the Federal government must subsidize illegal immigration. The Federal government is taxing workers to subsidize foreign competition for those worker's jobs. The Federal government is shooting itself in the foot by lowering wages and reducing tax revenue. The liberal agitprop to address (hide?) those consequences has been to demand increasing taxes on business. But those business taxes are ultimately paid by consumers so the liberal remedy is intentionally misleading.
Republicans are idiots on the issue of illegal immigration. The problem is not cultural; it's economic. But, no, the neoliberal asswipes in the Republican Party want to fight a culture war just so they can swindle, flimflam, and bamboozle the public while laughing all the way to the bank. And Democrats love to fight that culture war because no one seems to notice they're grifting their way to wealth.