Foreign Policy "Twofer" from Bloomberg and the NYT

Two articles today, in two different journals, are more or less on the same topic: maniacal behavior leads to being thought of as a maniac.

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Bloomberg View : What Tillerson Won't Admit: The U.S. Has No Leverage

His year-end wrap-up of diplomatic success in fact illustrates American weakness.

Where's the strategy?
Kevin Dietsch/Bloomberg

Secretary of State Rex Tillerson may think his year-end summary of U.S. foreign policy is a tale of success. But the remarkable op-ed article in the New York Times in fact illustrates the opposite: It shows in chapter and verse how the U.S. lacks leverage over many of the critical challenges it faces globally. From North Korea to China to Russia and the Middle East, American objectives are clear -- and the Donald Trump administration has no credible road map to achieve them.

Start with North Korea. Tillerson’s argument is that President Trump’s confrontational strategy has worked. His proof is that Kim Jong Un’s provocative missile launches have enabled the U.S. to get three sanctions resolutions from the United Nations Security Council.

Let’s leave to one side the obvious objection that Kim’s provocations would’ve produced a strong international reaction even if Trump hadn’t continually increased the sense of crisis with his own insulting rhetoric. The Trump administration and Nikki Haley, the UN ambassador, deserve credit for shepherding the resolutions to passage.

Yet the resolutions don’t have much prospect of reducing the North Korean nuclear threat or changing Kim’s behavior. North Korea’s nuclear program is intended to protect the regime’s existence. Backing down on missiles would simply weaken Kim -- and he knows it.

The North Korean regime has for many years survived the privations to which it subjects it citizens. It can continue to survive even with new sanctions. The upshot is that U.S. and international leverage over North Korea remains weak.

What’s more, Trump has made no progress in gaining leverage against China, which alone has the economic importance to squeeze North Korea. Tillerson admits as much, writing that China “could and should do more” to pressure its unruly ally.

Yet China has no interest in a failed or existentially weakened North Korea, which it needs as a buffer against U.S. ally South Korea. And there is no prospect of changing this Chinese incentive.

Trump talked a big game on China during his presidential campaign -- and has delivered nothing, diplomatically speaking. Tillerson offers a correct diagnosis of the problem: “China’s rise as an economic and military power,” he writes, “requires Washington and Beijing to consider carefully how to manage our relationship for the next 50 years.”

In other words, the cool war between the U.S. and China is continuing. [1] But the Trump administration, including Tillerson, has taken no visible steps to figure out how that cool war should be shaped.

One approach would seek to contain China’s military growth; another would try to limit China’s economic influence by regional alliances like the Trans-Pacific Partnership that Trump deep-sixed. Still another would accept China’s rise and encourage its participation in the liberal international order. Trump has opted for “none of the above” -- but without choosing any identifiable strategy.

This failure reflects the reality that U.S. options are constrained by the risks of challenging China too directly, either militarily or diplomatically.

Things are still worse when it comes to Russia, the Achilles’ heel of the Trump administration. Tillerson dutifully repeats that “there cannot be business as usual” with Russia so long as the invasion of Ukraine remains unresolved. But he goes on to say that the U.S. must work with Russia in Syria.

The reality is that Russian President Vladimir Putin has delivered Syrian President Bashar al-Assad a victory over both Islamic State and free Syrian forces. The U.S. was never prepared to get rid of Assad. But the victory of his brutal, pro-Iranian regime can’t be counted as a U.S. win.

The trouble is that there isn’t much the U.S. can do about it. Trump claims victory over Islamic State, but at least in Syria that win is more Putin’s than his. Good luck moving Putin on Ukraine now.

All this brings us to Iran. Tillerson writes that the nuclear deal “is no longer the focal point” of U.S. policy. That’s a relief -- but it’s so because Trump has no real leverage over Iran via sanctions. Europe can continue its economic ties with Tehran even if the U.S. were to withdraw from the nuclear deal.

Instead, Tillerson effectively hints, Trump’s pro-Saudi policy is intended to isolate Iran. Over the long run, a strengthened Saudi-Israel axis would indeed be bad for Iran -- but that depends on an Israel-Palestine peace deal that is unlikely at best, and that isn't even mentioned in Tillerson’s essay. For now, U.S. leverage on Iran is minimal.

Finally, there is Pakistan, where Trump has deviated slightly from precedent by faulting the government for supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan more publicly than did George W. Bush or Barack Obama. Those presidents didn’t trust Pakistan either, but they found they had no choice but to engage various governments there, despite Pakistan’s ongoing double game.

Trump doesn’t have any better leverage than his predecessors on Pakistan. Tillerson wrote that the U.S. will partner with Pakistan if the country will “demonstrate its desire to partner with us.” That’s a carrot, to be sure -- but until there is a meaningful stick, Pakistan will continue its long-term policy of hedging against eventual U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the return of the Taliban to power there, not to mention the rise of Islamic State in the region.

The first year of Trump diplomacy is therefore not one of which Tillerson should be especially proud. Neither he nor Trump is responsible for limits to U.S. leverage. But they are responsible for adopting policies designed to address the reality of those limits -- and so far, they mostly haven’t.

[1] I first called it that in 2013, and recently Senator John Cornyn adopted the terminology.

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Original article

by Noah Feldman

Bloomberg View

There may be links in the Original Article that have not been reproduced here.

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New York Times : Trump, the Insurgent, Breaks With 70 Years of American Foreign Policy

President Trump has transformed the world’s view of the United States from an anchor of the international order into something more inward-looking and unpredictable.

President Trump, boarding Air Force One in May
Stephen Crowley/The New York Times

President Trump was already revved up when he emerged from his limousine to visit NATO’s new headquarters in Brussels last May. He had just met France’s recently elected president, Emmanuel Macron, whom he greeted with a white-knuckle handshake and a complaint that Europeans do not pay their fair share of the alliance’s costs.

On the long walk through the NATO building’s cathedral-like atrium, the president’s anger grew. He looked at the polished floors and shimmering glass walls with a property developer’s eye. (“It’s all glass,” he said later. “One bomb could take it out.”) By the time he reached an outdoor plaza where he was to speak to the other NATO leaders, Mr. Trump was fuming, according to two aides who were with him that day.

He was there to dedicate the building, but instead he took a shot at it.

“I never asked once what the new NATO headquarters cost,” Mr. Trump told the leaders, his voice thick with sarcasm. “I refuse to do that. But it is beautiful.” His visceral reaction to the $1.2 billion building, more than anything else, colored his first encounter with the alliance, aides said.

Nearly a year into his presidency, Mr. Trump remains an erratic, idiosyncratic leader on the global stage, an insurgent who attacks allies the United States has nurtured since World War II and who can seem more at home with America’s adversaries. His Twitter posts, delivered without warning or consultation, often make a mockery of his administration’s policies and subvert the messages his emissaries are trying to deliver abroad.

Mr. Trump has pulled out of trade and climate change agreements and denounced the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran. He has broken with decades of American policy in the Middle East by recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. And he has taunted Kim Jong-un of North Korea as “short and fat,” fanning fears of war on the peninsula.

He has assiduously cultivated President Xi Jinping of China and avoided criticizing President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia — leaders of the two countries that his own national security strategy calls the greatest geopolitical threats to America.

Above all, Mr. Trump has transformed the world’s view of the United States from a reliable anchor of the liberal, rules-based international order into something more inward-looking and unpredictable. That is a seminal change from the role the country has played for 70 years, under presidents from both parties, and it has lasting implications for how other countries chart their futures.

Mr. Trump’s unorthodox approach “has moved a lot of us out of our comfort zone, me included,” the national security adviser, Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster, said in an interview. A three-star Army general who served in Iraq and Afghanistan and wrote a well-regarded book about the White House’s strategic failure in Vietnam, General McMaster defined Trump foreign policy as “pragmatic realism” rather than isolationism.

“The consensus view has been that engagement overseas is an unmitigated good, regardless of the circumstances,” General McMaster said. “But there are problems that are maybe both intractable and of marginal interest to the American people, that do not justify investments of blood and treasure.”

Mr. Trump’s advisers argue that he has blown the cobwebs off decades of foreign policy doctrine and, as he approaches his first anniversary, that he has learned the realities of the world in which the United States must operate.

They point to gains in the Middle East, where Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is transforming Saudi Arabia; in Asia, where China is doing more to pressure a nuclear-armed North Korea; and even in Europe, where Mr. Trump’s criticism has prodded NATO members to ante up more for their defense.

The president takes credit for eradicating the caliphate built by the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, though he mainly accelerated a battle plan developed by President Barack Obama. His aides say he has reversed Mr. Obama’s passive approach to Iran, in part by disavowing the nuclear deal.

While Mr. Trump has held more than 130 meetings and phone calls with foreign leaders since taking office, he has left the rest of the world still puzzling over how to handle an American president unlike any other. Foreign leaders have tested a variety of techniques to deal with him, from shameless pandering to keeping a studied distance.

“Most foreign leaders are still trying to get a handle on him,” said Richard N. Haass, a top State Department official in the George W. Bush administration who is now the president of the Council on Foreign Relations. “Everywhere I go, I’m still getting asked, ‘Help us understand this president, help us navigate this situation.’

“We’re beginning to see countries take matters into their own hands. They’re hedging against America’s unreliability.”

Mr. Trump met with Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, second from left,
and other members of the Group of 7 in Italy in May.
Stephen Crowley/The New York Times

Difficulties With Merkel

Few countries have struggled more to adapt to Mr. Trump than Germany, and few leaders seem less personally in sync with him than its leader, Chancellor Angela Merkel, the physicist-turned-politician. After she won a fourth term, their relationship took on weighty symbolism: the great disrupter versus the last defender of the liberal world order.

In one of their first phone calls, the chancellor explained to the president why Ukraine was a vital part of the trans-Atlantic relationship. Mr. Trump, officials recalled, had little idea of Ukraine’s importance, its history of being bullied by Russia or what the United States and its allies had done to try to push back Mr. Putin.

German officials were alarmed by Mr. Trump’s lack of knowledge, but they got even more rattled when White House aides called to complain afterward that Ms. Merkel had been condescending toward the new president. The Germans were determined not to repeat that diplomatic gaffe when Ms. Merkel met Mr. Trump at the White House in March.

At first, things again went badly. Mr. Trump did not shake Ms. Merkel’s hand in the Oval Office, despite the requests of the assembled photographers. (The president said he did not hear them.)

Later, he told Ms. Merkel that he wanted to negotiate a new bilateral trade agreement with Germany. The problem with this idea was that Germany, as a member of the European Union, could not negotiate its own agreement with the United States.

Rather than exposing Mr. Trump’s ignorance, Ms. Merkel said the United States could, of course, negotiate a bilateral agreement, but that it would have to be with Germany and the other 27 members of the union because Brussels conducted such negotiations on behalf of its members.

“So it could be bilateral?” Mr. Trump asked Ms. Merkel, according to several people in the room. The chancellor nodded.

“That’s great,” Mr. Trump replied before turning to his commerce secretary, Wilbur Ross, and telling him, “Wilbur, we’ll negotiate a bilateral trade deal with Europe.”

Afterward, German officials expressed relief among themselves that Ms. Merkel had managed to get through the exchange without embarrassing the president or appearing to lecture him. Some White House officials, however, said they found the episode humiliating.

For Ms. Merkel and many other Germans, something elemental has changed across the Atlantic. “We Europeans must really take our destiny into our own hands,” she said in May. “The times in which we can fully count on others — they are somewhat over.”

President Xi Jinping of China reopened a long-dormant theater inside the Forbidden City
to present Mr. Trump and his wife, Melania, an evening of Chinese opera last month.
Doug Mills/The New York Times

Better Relations With Autocrats

Mr. Trump gets along better with Mr. Macron, a 40-year-old former investment banker and fellow political insurgent who ran for the French presidency as the anti-Trump. Despite disagreeing with him on trade, immigration and climate change, Mr. Macron figured out early how to appeal to the president: He invited him to a military parade.

But Mr. Macron has discovered that being buddies with Mr. Trump can also be complicated. During the Bastille Day visit, officials recalled, Mr. Trump told Mr. Macron he was rethinking his decision to pull out of the Paris climate accord.

That prompted French diplomats to make a flurry of excited calls to the White House for clarification the following week, only to find out that American policy had not changed. White House officials say that Mr. Trump was merely reiterating that the United States would be open to rejoining the pact on more advantageous terms.

But the exchange captures Mr. Trump’s lack of nuance or detail, which leaves him open to being misunderstood in complex international talks.

There have been fewer misunderstandings with autocrats. Mr. Xi of China and King Salman of Saudi Arabia both won over Mr. Trump by giving him a lavish welcome when he visited. The Saudi monarch projected his image on the side of a hotel; Mr. Xi reopened a long-dormant theater inside the Forbidden City to present Mr. Trump and his wife, Melania, an evening of Chinese opera.

“Did you see the show?” Mr. Trump asked reporters on Air Force One after he left Beijing in November. “They say in the history of people coming to China, there’s been nothing like that. And I believe it.”

Later, chatting with his aides, Mr. Trump continued to marvel at the respect Mr. Xi had shown him. It was a show of respect for the American people, not just for the president, one adviser replied gently.

Then, of course, there is the strange case of Mr. Putin. The president spoke of his warm telephone calls with the Russian president, even as he introduced a national security strategy that acknowledged Russia’s efforts to weaken democracies by meddling in their elections.

Mr. Trump has had a bumpier time with friends. He told off Prime Minister Theresa May on Twitter, after she objected to his exploitation of anti-Muslim propaganda from a far-right group in Britain.

“Statecraft has been singularly absent from the treatment of some of his allies, particularly the U.K.,” said Peter Westmacott, a former British ambassador to the United States.

Mr. Trump’s feuds with Ms. May and other British officials have left him in a strange position: feted in Beijing and Riyadh but barely welcome in London, which Mr. Trump is expected to visit early next year, despite warnings that he will face angry protesters.

Aides to Mr. Trump argue that his outreach to autocrats has been vindicated. When Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman visited the White House in March, the president lavished attention on him. Since then, they say, Saudi Arabia has reopened cinemas and allowed women to drive.

But critics say Mr. Trump gives more than he gets. By backing the 32-year-old crown prince so wholeheartedly, the president cemented his status as heir to the House of Saud. The crown prince has since jailed his rivals as Saudi Arabia pursued a deadly intervention in Yemen’s civil war.

Mr. Trump granted an enormous concession to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu when he announced earlier this month that the United States would formally recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. But he did not ask anything of Mr. Netanyahu in return.

That showed another hallmark of Mr. Trump’s foreign policy: how much it is driven by domestic politics. In this case, he was fulfilling a campaign promise to move the American Embassy to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv. While evangelicals and some hard-line, pro-Israel American Jews exulted, the Palestinians seethed — leaving Mr. Trump’s dreams of brokering a peace accord between them and the Israelis in tatters.

With China, Mr. Trump’s cultivation of Mr. Xi probably persuaded him to put more economic pressure on its neighbor North Korea over its provocative behavior. But even the president has acknowledged, as recently as Thursday, that it is not enough. And in return for Mr. Xi’s efforts, Mr. Trump has largely shelved his trade agenda vis-à-vis Beijing.

“It was a big mistake to draw that linkage,” said Robert B. Zoellick, who served as United States trade representative under Mr. Bush. “The Chinese are playing him, and it’s not just the Chinese. The world sees his narcissism and strokes his ego, diverting him from applying disciplined pressure.”

Mr. Trump’s protectionist instincts could prove the most damaging in the long term, Mr. Zoellick said. Trade, unlike security, springs from deeply rooted convictions. Mr. Trump believes that multilateral accords — like the Trans-Pacific Partnership, from which he pulled out in his first week in office — are stacked against America.

“He views trade as zero-sum, win-lose,” Mr. Zoellick said.

Globalist and nationalist voices are often competing for influence over Mr. Trump’s foreign policy decisions.
Stephen Crowley/The New York Times

Globalists vs. Nationalists

For some of Mr. Trump’s advisers, the key to understanding his statecraft is not how he deals with Mr. Xi or Ms. Merkel, but the ideological contest over America’s role that plays out daily between the West Wing and agencies like the State Department and the Pentagon.

“There’s a chasm that can’t be bridged between the globalists and the nationalists,” said Stephen K. Bannon, the president’s former chief strategist and the leader of the nationalist wing, who has kept Mr. Trump’s ear since leaving the White House last summer.

On the globalist side of the debate stand General McMaster; Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis; Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson; and Mr. Trump’s chief economic adviser, Gary D. Cohn. On the nationalist side, in addition to Mr. Bannon, stand Stephen Miller, the president’s top domestic adviser, and Robert Lighthizer, the chief trade negotiator. On many days, the nationalist group includes the commander in chief himself.

The globalists have curbed some of Mr. Trump’s most radical impulses. He has yet to rip up the Iran nuclear deal, though he has refused to recertify it. He has reaffirmed the United States’ support for NATO, despite his objections about those members he believes are freeloading. And he has ordered thousands of additional American troops into Afghanistan, even after promising during the campaign to stay away from nation-building.

This has prompted a few Europeans to hope that “his bark is worse than his bite,” in the words of Mr. Westmacott.

Mr. Trump acknowledges that being in office has changed him. “My original instinct was to pull out,” he said of Afghanistan, “and, historically, I like following my instincts. But all my life I’ve heard that decisions are much different when you sit behind the desk in the Oval Office.”

Yet some things have not changed. Mr. Trump’s advisers have utterly failed to curb his Twitter posts, for example. Some gamely suggest that they create diplomatic openings. Others say they roll with the punches when he labels Mr. Kim of North Korea “Little Rocket Man.” For Mr. Tillerson, however, the tweets have severely tarnished his credibility in foreign capitals.

“All of them know they still can’t control the thunderbolt from on high,” said John D. Negroponte, who served as the director of national intelligence for Mr. Bush.

The tweets highlight that Mr. Trump still holds a radically different view of the United States’ role in the world than most of his predecessors. His advisers point to a revealing meeting at the Pentagon on July 20, when Mr. Mattis, Mr. Tillerson and Mr. Cohn walked the president through the country’s trade and security obligations around the world.

The group convened in the secure conference room of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a storied inner sanctum known as the tank. Mr. Mattis led off the session by declaring that “the greatest thing the ‘greatest generation’ left us was the rules-based postwar international order,” according to a person who was in the room.

After listening for about 50 minutes, this person said, Mr. Trump had heard enough. He began peppering Mr. Mattis and Mr. Tillerson with questions about who pays for NATO and the terms of the free trade agreements with South Korea and other countries.

The postwar international order, the president of the United States declared, is “not working at all.”

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Original article

by MARK LANDLER

NYT US

There may be links in the Original Article that have not been reproduced here.