Rubio Delivers Senate Floor Speech On The Crisis in Ukraine

Marco Rubio 10 years ago before he was infected by Trump.   

The crisis here is the 2014 invasion of Crimea by Putin.

S E E D E D   C O N T E N T

Transcript formatted by ChatGPT:

That's what I wanted to speak about today. I wanted to speak about the issue of Ukraine.

I get a lot of questions—phone calls, emails—about it. It's certainly been on the minds of a lot of people across the country. The most common question that I get is: what do we do about it? What can we do? And, related to that, the question of: why does this even matter? I'm going to get to that in my conclusion.

But on this motion that's now before the Senate, where we're being asked to vote on a package of sanctions and also assistance to Ukraine, I wanted to first outline what it is that we can do moving forward, in addition to this bill that's before us, but also why this bill is so important.

I think there are a couple of things that we really need to focus on in terms of our reaction to what's happened with regard to Crimea and Ukraine, in particular because of the Russian actions that have been taken.

I think the first and most important thing we need to do is help the Ukrainian people and the interim government in Ukraine protect their nation's sovereignty but also protect their transition to democracy—to full democracy. Now, they have elections scheduled in May of this year. These elections are going to be critical: that they go off smoothly, that they are free, and that they are fair, because that's an important step in their transition to democracy.

But we should anticipate that Russia, through Putin, is going to do everything they can to disrupt these elections, to delegitimize these elections. And we already see evidence, in open-source reporting in the media, that in fact there are highly trained agitators, sponsored by the Kremlin, who have found their way into Ukraine and could potentially participate in ways to try to disrupt these elections.

So I think one of the first things we can do, working with our allies in Europe, is help Ukraine with the logistical support they need to carry out fair and free elections in May. That will be the biggest step they've taken so far toward a transition to democracy in Ukraine.

The second thing we need to do in helping Ukraine protect its sovereignty and make its transition to democracy is help them stabilize their economy. Now, you can imagine—this disruptive change in government, combined with an invasion of its territories, has been highly disruptive to their economy, which was already feeling some real constraints.

And that's why the bill before us is so critical, because in addition to some of the direct assistance, it will help them access loans that will allow them to stabilize their economic situation. And again, what we can anticipate is that Russia is going to do everything it can to disrupt their economy.

Again, the Russian argument here—and it's a ridiculous argument—but the argument they're making to the world is: Ukraine is a failed state. The Russian-speaking population is being threatened. And so, we have to get involved; we must intervene to try to stabilize that situation. That's the argument they've made in Crimea, and increasingly, that's the argument they seem to be making with regard to eastern Ukraine.

So the bill before us is critical because it will be a major step on the part of this government, in conjunction with our allies in Europe, to help Ukraine stabilize its economy.

Now, as I've shared before, I have some real concerns about some language in this bill. It has to do with these changes to the IMF that I don't think belong in this legislation. I don't think they belong for two reasons. One, I don't think we should be taking up an issue of that importance in this manner—we should have a full debate on that, and it should be dealt with separately.

But I also think it was a mistake by this administration to include the IMF language in this bill. What we need as much as anything else is not just to pass this thing out of the Senate but to pass it with the most amount of support possible.

I wanted to see it be 100 to nothing, or 95 to 5, so we could send a very strong message to Russia and to the world that the United States of America and her people are firmly on the side of Ukraine’s sovereignty, Ukraine’s desire for independence from Russia, and Ukraine’s ability to stabilize its country moving forward. That, quite frankly, is endangered as a result of the administration’s decision to push this divisive language into this bill. There was no reason for them to do that.

And in fact, that sentiment isn’t just a Republican sentiment. It’s being echoed in the House, where a number of Democrats today are quoted in newspaper articles as saying that this was a mistake—that they should never have done this. If they were to take this language out, we would pass a bill in the House and Senate this week. We could have passed one before we left two weeks ago. Instead, it continues to go through a prolonged debate and divisiveness, and there are people who have had to vote against it here on the floor because they feel so strongly about the IMF language. We could have had their support. We could have sent a stronger message than the one being sent now.

I have those concerns.

By the way, there was a statement made on the floor yesterday that I think deserves to be addressed. The majority leader stood here and said that, basically, Republicans are responsible for the loss of Crimea in an effort to help a family that’s engaged in American politics. I think that statement is absurd and ridiculous. I think it's the kind of hyperbole that has no place in an issue such as this.

At some point, there have to be issues so big and so important to the national security of this country that they are above politics and above that sort of statement.

That being said, while I share the same concerns that many of my colleagues do about the IMF language and initially expressed my position that I was not willing to vote for this bill with it, after much thought and consideration over the last couple of weeks—researching the issue—I came to the conclusion that, in the cost-benefit analysis, helping Ukraine stabilize itself, helping Ukraine stabilize its economy, given the importance of this issue, is so critical that I am prepared to vote for this despite the fact that it has something in it that I do not like.

That's how important I think this issue truly is. And oftentimes, by the way, in foreign policy, that’s what we’re called to do—we’re called to make pragmatic decisions that are in the best interest of America and our allies around the world, even if it’s less than ideal or perhaps not the complete solution that we want.

And that’s why I’m prepared—that’s why I voted to proceed with the debate on this bill yesterday, and that’s why I’m prepared to support it despite the inclusion of IMF language that I’m strongly against—because I think this issue is that important.

The third thing we can do to help Ukraine protect its sovereignty and make its full transition to democracy is help them with their defense capabilities.

Now, understand that in 1991, when the Soviet Union fell, in the early 1990s, Ukraine was left with the world's third-largest stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons on the planet. But they signed this agreement with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia that basically said: If you give up your nuclear weapons, we—these three countries that signed this—will provide for your defense and assure you of your defense.

And so Ukraine did that. They gave up these weapons.

Well, now, this was signed in 1994. Twenty years later, one of the three countries that signed that agreement hasn’t just not provided for the defense—they actually invaded them. And I want to make a point on this for a second.

Think about it: if you're one of these other countries around the world right now that feels threatened by your neighbors, and the United States and the rest of the world are saying to you, Listen, don’t develop nuclear weapons. Don’t develop nuclear weapons, South Korea. Don’t develop nuclear weapons, Japan. Don’t develop nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia. We will protect you. We will watch out for you.

What kind of lesson do you think this instance sends to them?

I think the message it's sending to many nations around the world is: Perhaps we can no longer count on the security promises made by the free world. Perhaps we need to start looking out for ourselves.

And that's why the Ukrainian situation is so much more important than simply what's happening in Europe—this has implications around the world.

There are a number of countries around the world now that are considering increasing their defense capabilities, including a nuclear capacity, because they feel threatened by neighbors that have a nuclear capacity themselves. So far, they've held back on that because they have relied on the United States and our partners to assure them that they don’t need these weapons, that we have their back.

But now, when something like this happens, these countries see it as further evidence that potentially those sorts of assurances are no longer enough in the 21st century. And it raises the real risk that, over the next two decades, you could see an explosion in the number of countries around the world that possess a nuclear weapons capability—because they now feel that they must protect themselves and can no longer rely on other countries to do it for them.

So how can we help Ukraine with its military and defense capabilities? By providing them assistance.

And, by the way, the Ukrainian military capability degraded not just because of their overconfidence in these assurances that were made to them. There was also corruption in that government. In fact, the previous president—who was ousted by a popular revolt—actually undermined the defense capabilities of that country. He took a lot of that money and used it for internal control, to be able to control his own population, instead of being able to protect his country.

So what can we do to help?

The first thing that I’ve called for us to do is to provide Ukraine with more military equipment and more training. We should work with our NATO allies and the European Union to help equip and train the Ukrainian military forces so that they can protect their country now and moving forward.

We can also share intelligence information with them to help them better position their assets and have a better awareness of what’s going on around them. We can also help them with logistical support. These are the sorts of things that I hope this administration will take steps toward in the next couple of days.

So that's the first thing we can do: we can help Ukraine protect its sovereignty and make its full transition to democracy.

The second thing we need to do is continue to raise the price on Putin for the invasion of Crimea. We need to change the cost-benefit calculation that he's going to go through as he decides whether to move into eastern Ukraine now, and potentially even parts of Moldova.

Already, some steps have been taken in that regard, and I applaud the administration for having announced additional sanctions last week. I think we’re going to have to continue to do more in conjunction with our allies.

I think we need to add more names—of individuals, financial institutions, and businesses, primarily those that have links to this invasion, but also to Russia’s involvement in supporting the Syrian regime as it carries out the mass slaughter of its own people.

I think we need to suspend our civil nuclear cooperation agreement that was entered into as part of the 123 Agreement four years ago, as a strong message to them.

I think we need to reassess the role that NATO plays in Europe. NATO was largely built around the Soviet risk in Eastern and Western Europe. Then, after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, NATO kind of lost its way a little bit in terms of its role in Europe because there was no threat. In fact, you saw some of these countries saying, You know, it's likely that NATO's role now will be about operations in the Middle East or in Africa, and being involved in threats there, as opposed to actually having to defend our own territory.

But the facts on the ground in Europe have changed dramatically in the last two months.

You now, in fact, do have a powerful military force in the region that has shown a willingness to invade a neighbor. They did this, by the way, in 2008 in Georgia. They're doing it again now, in a way that's even more egregious and outrageous.

And I think it's time for NATO to reevaluate its capabilities, given this new threat that’s here to stay.

Also, the time has come for NATO to reposition its assets to face this threat and this risk. I think—and I hope—that those conversations are happening now.

I think, in many respects, it's time to reinvigorate this alliance because it has a clear and present danger in Europe in the form of the government of Vladimir Putin, which threatens its neighbors and the stability of Europe.

Now, I think NATO has found a reason to reinvigorate itself.

The last point I would make in terms of changing the calculus is this: the real stranglehold that Russia has on Europe is not simply its military capabilities—it’s its natural resources.

Much of Europe depends on Russia for its oil and for its natural gas. And this creates a tremendous amount of leverage over their neighbors.

One of the reasons why you have seen some countries in Europe reluctant to move forward on even higher sanctions is because they are afraid of losing access to natural gas and oil from Russia, which their economy depends on.

We need to change that. That can’t happen overnight, but we need to begin to change it.

First, by increasing our exports to those countries—in particular, Ukraine. And I know Senator Barrasso will have an amendment as part of this debate that I hope will be considered, one that will allow us to export more natural gas to Ukraine.

But the other thing that needs to happen is that other countries in Europe need to develop their own domestic capabilities in natural gas so they can become less reliant on Russia for these resources and become more reliant on themselves and free countries in the region. That is a critical component of a long-term strategy in all of this.

Let me just close by answering the question I began with: Why does this matter?

I think this matters for a lot of different reasons. I've highlighted one in terms of decisions that are being made around the world—governments that have to decide whether they're going to pursue their own domestic nuclear weapons capability or not.

But there's another that perhaps we need to think about.

After World War II—back after the last century, when the world went through two devastating world wars—there was a commitment made that no longer would nations be allowed to aggressively invade other countries, take over territory, and exercise illegitimate claims.

In fact, international norms were established at the end of World War II. Now, there were some conflicts during the Cold War with Russia, with the Soviet Union, and with the spread of communism. But by and large, especially since the end of the Cold War, that's been the established norm: It is not acceptable in the late 20th century and in the early 21st century for a country to simply make up an excuse, invade a neighbor, and take their land and their territory.

That perhaps was the way of the world 300 years ago, 200 years ago, even 100 years ago. There were massive wars and loss of life as a result of countries doing that. But the world grew tired of these conflicts and decided: We will no longer tolerate or accept these sorts of things.

If you recall, in the early 1990s, Saddam Hussein did that—he invaded Kuwait. And the entire world community rallied around the United States of America to expel him from there as a result of that illegitimate action.

But now, in the 21st century, we have the most egregious violation of that norm.

You basically have Russia that has decided: We don’t like the way things are going in Ukraine, so we’re going to invade. We’re going to take over a territory.

And think about how they did it.

They deny that they’re doing it. They send Russian troops into Crimea—but they had them wear uniforms that had no markings on them. In fact, the press would ask these soldiers, Where are you from?—they wouldn’t answer.

They invaded a country, but they lied about their invasion. They claimed these were local defense forces that had rallied around the Russian flag. They made up this excuse that somehow the Russian-speaking population in the region was being oppressed, attacked, and in danger, so they needed to intervene.

Even to this day, they still will not admit the military role they are playing on the ground in Crimea.

So, in addition to violating this international norm—which is outrageous behavior—they have lied about it and think they can get away with it.

And the point that I'm making is: Even in the 21st century, if a country is allowed to invade a neighbor, lie about it, lie about the reasons for it, and get away with it without significant costs, we have created a dangerous precedent that we are going to have to live with.

Because all over the world, there are powerful nations who now claim that land they do not control belongs to them.

I took a trip in February to Asia—I visited Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea. And you know what the number one fear in that region is?

That China has similar claims to Russia.

They claim that all sorts of pieces of territory and areas of the oceans belong to them. They claim it belonged to them a thousand years ago and should belong to them now.

Now, they've taken a different tact. But the point is: If we now live in a world where a country can make territorial claims and then simply act on them without any repercussions from the international community, then I think the 21st century is starting to look more and more like the early 20th century—a time that subjected the world to two devastating world wars.

We cannot allow this to go unpunished.

And I tell you, the only way that this can be punished is if the free countries of the world rally together and impose sanctions and costs for having taken this action—on Vladimir Putin and on his cronies.

And that will never happen.

The free world will never be able to rally to impose those costs unless the United States of America leads that effort.

We can't do it alone.

But it cannot be done without us.

And that's why it's so important that measures like the one the Senate is now considering happen with the highest amount of bipartisan support we can muster.

We may not agree with every aspect of it—I certainly do not—but when you weigh the equities here, if you were to put this on a scale, the need to do something about Ukraine so far outweighs the things about this legislation before us that we don’t like.

Because of the implications it has—not just on our nation, but on the world and the role we have.

You know, if some other country around the world fails to pass sanctions, fails to take steps, or does so in a way that’s divided, it might have some impact.

But when the United States of America fails to act in a decisive way, it has a dramatic impact.

You know one of the arguments that our adversaries around the world use?

They tell our allies, Why are you still in the U.S. camp? Why are you still aligning yourself with the United States? They are unreliable. Their government is always bickering and deeply divided. They can’t come together in Washington to do anything. Do you think if you’re ever invaded or ever get into trouble that the U.S. could possibly muster the domestic political support necessary for them to come to your assistance? Don’t count on America. Count on us, or count on yourself.

And I've already explained why there's danger in that.

But that’s the argument that these countries use against us.

And what I fear is that if we fail to take decisive and unified action in this body, in the Senate, to send a strong message—that while we may not all agree on every component of this, and I’ve already told you it was a mistake for the administration to push for that IMF reform language—but I fear that if we do not send a strong and decisive message, then this will be spun against us.

I think this will be used as evidence to our allies and other countries around the world that America is no longer reliable—either economically or militarily.

And the consequences of that could extend far beyond Europe, into other regions of the world, like Asia.

This is not a game.

This is not some domestic political dispute.

This issue has ramifications that will directly impact the kind of world that our children will inherit.

In fact, it will dramatically impact the kind of world that you and I will have to live in over the next 20, 30, and 40 years.

We cannot afford to make a mistake on this.

And we cannot afford to be wrong.

And so I hope that I can urge as many of my colleagues as possible to support this legislation—with all of its flaws—so that we can send a clear message that, on these issues, we are united as a people and as a nation.

And that we remain committed to U.S. global leadership.