╌>

How Rouhani Is Playing Obama -- His conciliation strategy is intended to buy time and legitimacy to build a bomb

  

Category:  News & Politics

Via:  len  •  13 years ago  •  3 comments

How Rouhani Is Playing Obama -- His conciliation strategy is intended to buy time and legitimacy to build a bomb

WS Journal OPINION September 29, 2013.

By JOHN BOLTON

Monday ends the worst month of the Obama presidency. The Syrian diplomatic and political debacle was bad enough, but last week at the United Nations President Obama embarked on a campaign for "progress" with Iran that will prove much more dangerous for American interests. Just as Vladimir Putin had played him for a fool over Syria, Mr. Obama was initially snubbed by Iranian President Hasan Rouhani despite frantic White House efforts to produce a handshake.

On Friday, after a brief Obama-Rouhani telephone call, Mr. Obama said that a "comprehensive solution" between countries is possible. And this despite Thursday's meeting of foreign ministers, including Secretary of State John Kerry and Iran's Mohammad Javad Zarif, that was little more than a photo-op.

Mr. Obama's yearning fits smoothly into the PR campaign by President Rouhani, Iran's new frontman. The campaign has included showcasing Iran's only Jewish parliamentarian (a staunch opponent of Israel), offering dialogue with the West (catnip for the gullible), and a soothing Washington Post op-ed.

Separating propaganda, hype and disinformation from Iran's real objectives is critical. Unfortunately, too many already believe that Mr. Rouhani's election marked a substantive rather than a cosmetic policy shift. Instead of blustering about Iran's nuclear program and threatening Israel, Mr. Rouhani has sounded conciliatory, carefully using his first weeks in office to cloud Western memories of his predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

President Rouhani knows what his Western audience wants to hear. As Iran's chief nuclear negotiator in 2003-05, he followed the same playbook, and it worked. By offering what appeared to be concessions, Iran acquired precious time and legitimacy to overcome scientific and technical glitches in its nuclear-weapons program, particularly at Isfahan's uranium-conversion facility.

In articles and speeches, Mr. Rouhani boasted of his successes. In 2006, he taunted the West, saying "by creating a calm environment, we were able to complete the work on Isfahan." Even such open disdain has not triggered enough U.S. or European embarrassment to protect against being suckered again. Iran's "moderates" are now targeting the Obama soft spot in Western opposition to Iran's nuclear program, and methodically exploiting it.

In marked contrast, Mr. Obama enters negotiations gravely weakened by his Syria failures. Yet soothed by his media choir, he seems unaware how deeply he has been wounded. He confidently believes he is well-placed to treat with the ayatollahs despite a series of foreign-policy failures.

Over the past year, Mr. Obama failed in his stated objective to oust Syria's Assad regime from power; failed to impress Assad that his "red line" against using chemical weapons was serious; failed to exact retribution when that red line was crossed; failed to rally anything but small minorities in either house of Congress to support his position; and failed to grasp that agreements with the likes of Syria and Russia prolong, rather than solve, the chemical-weapons problem.

Mr. Obama is inverting Dean Acheson's maxim that Washington should only negotiate from strength. Even if there were some prospect that Iran could be talked out of its nuclear-weapons program, which there is not, the White House approach is the wrong way to start discussions. Given the president's palpable unwillingness to use the military to enforce his Syria red linelet alone to answer the Sept. 11, 2012, Benghazi terrorist attackand his paucity of domestic political support, Iran's ayatollahs know that the president's "all options on the table" incantation regarding their nuclear program carries no weight.

Iran undoubtedly wants relief from international sanctions, which have exacerbated decades of incompetent economic policy. But there is no evidence that the sanctions have impaired Iran's nuclear or ballistic-missile programs. Instead, Tehran has increased its financial and military assistance to Assad and Hezbollah in Syria.

Mr. Rouhani's strategy is clear: Lower the rhetorical temperature about the nuclear issue; make temporary, cosmetic concessions, such as allowing inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency at already-declared nuclear sites; and gain Western acceptance of its "reactor-grade" uranium enrichment. Once that goal is attained, Iran's path to nuclear weapons will be unobstructed and within Tehran's discretion.

Iran will demand in return that international sanctions be eased, focusing first on obtaining small reductions to signal Western "good faith." Mr. Obama and Europe already seem eager to comply. Western diplomats will assert defensively that these concessions are merely a matter of "sequencing," and that they expect substantive Iranian concessions. They will wait a long time. Mr. Rouhani fully understands that once sanctions start rolling back, restoring them will be hard, perhaps impossible, absent a major provocation.

Mr. Rouhani will not supply one. Instead, he will continue making on-again, off-again gestures seducing the West into protracted negotiations. Meanwhile, Iran's nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs will proceed unimpeded in unknown, undisclosed locations. This was his 2003-05 playbook.

Extended negotiations will enable Mr. Obama to argue that a "diplomatic process" is under way to resolve the Iranian nuclear threat. No phrase is more beloved at the State Department. Mr. Obama will then use this process on Israel to prevent pre-emptive military action against Iran's nuclear program.

In time, even Hamlet came to understand that "one may smile, and smile, and be a villain." Maybe one day President Obama will figure it out.

Mr. Bolton is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and the author of "Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad" (Simon & Schuster, 2007).

Copyright 2012 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved


Tags

jrDiscussion - desc
[]
 
Len
Freshman Silent
link   seeder  Len    13 years ago

Russia, Iran, Damascus may crank up border tensions to weaken Netanyahus hand in America

A chemical weapons store
A chemical weapons store
DEBKA file Special Report Sep 29, 2013, 9:08 AM (IDT)

Western military sources predict an upsurge of tension this week along Israels borders with Syria and Lebanon, timed for Binyamin Netanyahus White House meeting with President Barack Obama Monday, Sept. 30, and his address to the UN General Assembly the next day, Oct. 1. Moscow, Tehran and Damascus may exploit Israels weak moment after being pushed out in the cold by the Obama administrations pursuit of new relations with Tehran, by provoking Israel into a military response and presenting it as the neighborhoodwarmonger and disrupter of US-Russian diplomacy.

More>
 
 
 
Len
Freshman Silent
link   seeder  Len    13 years ago

The New Rouhani

Same as the old Rouhani.

Oct 7, 2013 , Vol. 19, No. 05 By REUEL MARC GERECHT

Excerpts:

Its perhaps a peccadillo to point out that Rouhani has consistently lied about the nuclear program, claiming that its always been peaceful and observant of International Atomic Energy Agency guidelines. Rouhani headed the nuclear negotiations from 2003 to 2005, at their most challenging time. In late 2002, Irans clandestine nuclear program was exposed, and George W. Bush, whom Tehran feared, was massing men and weapons for an invasion of Iraq. Rouhani did what he couldvery successfully in retrospectto keep the nuclear program going without angering the West, especially the Americans. The temporary suspension of enrichment showed flexibility in the face of overwhelming military might. So did Khameneis decision to temporarily suspend weaponization research at the Parchin military facility.

In truth, though the Iranians didnt know it, there was near-zero chance that Bush would extend the war to a second member of the axis of evil, the Islamic Republic. As Tehran began to question American resolve because of the difficulties in Iraq, Iranian confidence rose. This manifested itself in the rapid and open progress in uranium enrichment at Natanz. Properly read, Rouhanis nuclear memoirhe, too, thinks of posterityis a long cri de coeur of a sophisticated revolutionary cleric against his inferiors, the men whom the supreme leader had unwisely allowed to be the public face of the nuclear program.

Rouhanis triumph in the recent presidential election wasnt a victory for moderation and rationality in Iranian politicsthough Rouhani has superglued those words to his forehead. It was the triumph of class, of revolutionary clerics of good taste and slightly better economics, over the hoi polloi whod rallied to Ahmadinejad. Rouhanis gravamen against these crude militants was that theyd allowed Europe and America to unite economically against the Islamic Republic. Retrospectively, the clandestine efforts of Rafsanjani and Rouhani, and the open divide-and-conquer strategy of Khatami and Rouhani, looked much more effective, at least in Rouhanis eyes. Rouhani made the dubious claim that the Islamic Republic could have attained an advanced nuclear status without suffering from sanctions.

In 2003, the Islamic Republic made a panicked but calculated decision to open up its known nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection. The regime later lied about the buried-in-the-mountain Fordow enrichment plant and the Arak heavy-water plutonium-separation facility, but decided to allow IAEA some access there too, once these facilities were discovered. This meant that the regimes intention to deploy thousands of centrifuges under the noses of IAEA inspectors would eventually produce enormous tension with the IAEA and the West. The regime continued to lie about its program, especially about the clandestine weaponization research that we know took place before 2003 and that probably went on there-after. This track record of mendacity was bound to fuel the sanctions drive in Washington and Paris, the two key players in erecting the economic measures against Tehran.

The present state of play is that, if centrifuge production continues at current levels, by mid-2014 the regime will have a one-week breakout capacity, that is, it could take 20 percent enriched uranium and convert it to bomb-grade in seven days. What Rouhani is gambling is that Washington and Paris are unprepared to go to war. Instead, they will accept limited concessions, only delaying the Islamic Republics breakout date, in exchange for significant economic relief.

More:

 
 
 
sixpick
Professor Quiet
link   sixpick    13 years ago

Oh please Len, don't tell me you don't trust Iran?

 
 

Who is online



Gazoo


94 visitors