Liberals Calling Something ‘Discrimination’ Does Not Make It So
The biggest problem with current sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) laws—including “Fairness for All,” which proposes a grand-bargain compromise between SOGI laws and religious liberty—is that they do not appropriately define what counts as discriminatory.
As I explain in a new report for The Heritage Foundation, “How to Think About Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (SOGI) Policies and Religious Freedom,” these are the laws that are being used to shutter Catholic adoption agencies, fine evangelical bakers, and force business and public facilities to allow men into women’s locker rooms.
The problem is that liberals are calling anything they dislike “discrimination.” But liberals are getting it wrong. To illustrate this, consider several different cases of putative “discrimination.” The law must be nuanced enough to capture the important differences in these cases.
Invidious and Rightly Unlawful Discrimination
Racially segregated water fountains were one form of discrimination that took race into consideration—in a context where it was completely irrelevant—and then treated blacks as second-class citizens precisely because they were black. The entire point was to classify on the basis of race in order to treat blacks as socially inferior.
As a result, such actions were rightly described as invidious race-based discrimination, and—given the entrenched, widespread, state-facilitated nature of the problem—they were rightly made unlawful.
Likewise, throughout much of American history, girls and women were not afforded educational opportunities equal to those available to boys and men. This form of discrimination took sex into consideration and then treated girls and women poorly precisely because of their sex, barring them from education in certain subjects or at certain levels despite being otherwise qualified.
As with invidious racial discrimination, such treatment took a feature (in this case, sex) into consideration precisely to treat women as less than men. The law rightly deemed such actions invidious sex-based discrimination, and—again, given the entrenched, widespread, and state-facilitated nature of the problem—Title IX of the Education Amendments was enacted to ensure that girls and women received equal educational opportunities.
Appropriate and Rightly Lawful Distinctions That Are Not Classified as Discrimination
When Title IX was enacted in 1972 and its implementing regulations were promulgated in 1975, the law made clear that sex-specific housing, bathrooms, and locker rooms were not unlawful discrimination. Such policies take sex into consideration, but they do not treat women as inferior to men or men as inferior to women. They treat both sexes equally because they take sex into consideration (they “discriminate”—in the nonpejorative sense of “distinguish”—on the basis of sex) precisely in a way that matters: by appreciating the bodily sexual difference of men and women in things such as housing, bathroom, and locker room policy.
Would we really be treating men and women equally in anything but an artificial way if we forced men and women, boys and girls, to undress in front of each other?
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in her majority opinion for the Supreme Court forcing the Virginia Military Institute to become co-ed, wrote that it “would undoubtedly require alterations necessary to afford members of each sex privacy from the other sex in living arrangements.” Yet we certainly would be treating people unequally if access to intimate facilities were based on factors wholly unrelated to privacy, such as race.
As a result, policymakers did not consider sex-specific intimate facilities as discriminatory in the first place, and laws explicitly reflected that commonsense understanding while rightly declaring racially segregated facilities to be unlawful.
The lesson here is that not all distinctions in fact should be deemed unlawful discrimination.
Not Discriminatory at All
If sex-specific intimate facilities are an example of lawful, legitimate policies that take sex into consideration, pro-life medical practices are examples of policies that are legitimate and lawful because they do not take sex into consideration at all.
That only women can get pregnant has no bearing whatsoever on the judgment of the conscientious doctor or nurse who refuses to kill the unborn. The insistence of LGBT activists that men actually can become pregnant highlights the point: Pro-life medical personnel refuse to do abortions on pregnant women and “pregnant men” (i.e. women who identify as men).
Thus, we can identify three different types of cases:
Cases of invidious discrimination, in which an irrelevant factor is taken into consideration in order to treat people poorly based on that factor, as with racially segregated water fountains;
Cases of distinctions without unlawful discrimination, in which a factor is taken into consideration precisely because it is relevant to the underlying policy and people are not treated poorly, as with sex-specific intimate facilities; and
Cases with neither distinctions nor discrimination, in which a particular factor simply does not enter into consideration, as with pro-life doctors.
Any proposed policy intended to address the documented needs of people who identify as LGBT must take these categories into account without conflation.
SOGI Discrimination: Real and Imagined
Consider a florist who refused to serve all customers who identify as LGBT simply because they identified as LGBT. That would be a case of invidious discrimination because the mere knowledge that they identify as LGBT should have no impact whatsoever on the act of the florist selling flowers, because there is no rational connection between the two.
Now consider Baronelle Stutzman, the 71-year-old grandmother who served one particular gay costumer for nearly a decade but declined to do the wedding flowers for his same-sex wedding ceremony.
The customer’s sexual orientation did not play any role in Stutzman’s decision. Her belief that marriage is a union of sexually complementary spouses does not spring from any convictions about people who identify as LGBT. When she says she can do wedding flowers only for true weddings, she makes no distinctions based on sexual orientation at all.
This is seen most clearly in the case of Catholic Charities adoption agencies. They decline to place the children entrusted to their care with same-sex couples not because of their sexual orientation, but because of the conviction that children deserve both a mother and a father.
That belief—that men and women are not interchangeable, mothers and fathers are not replaceable, the two best dads in the world cannot make up for a missing mom, and the two best moms in the world cannot make up for a missing dad—has absolutely nothing to do with sexual orientation.
Catholic Charities does not say that people who identify as LGBT cannot love or care for children; it does not take sexual orientation into consideration at all. Its preference for placing children with mothers and fathers is not an instance of discrimination based on sexual orientation—and the law should not say otherwise.
Purported gender identity discrimination presents similar problems. The Washington Post recently reported on a woman who was suing a Catholic hospital for declining to perform a sex reassignment procedure on her that entailed removing her healthy uterus. In that report, the Post captures the conflation of real and imaginary discrimination.
“What the rule says is if you provide a particular service to anybody, you can’t refuse to provide it to anyone,” said Sarah Warbelow, the legal director for the Human Rights Campaign. That means a transgender person who shows up at an emergency room with something as basic as a twisted ankle cannot be denied care, as sometimes happens, Warbelow said. That also means if a doctor provides breast reconstruction surgery or hormone therapy, those services cannot be denied to transgender patients seeking them for gender dysphoria, she said.
The two examples given, however, differ in significant ways. A hospital that refuses to treat the twisted ankles of people who identify as transgender simply because they identify as transgender would be engaging in invidious discrimination, but a hospital that declines to remove the perfectly healthy uterus of a woman who identifies as a man is not engaging in “gender identity” discrimination.
The gender identity of the patient plays no role in the decision-making process: Just as pro-life physicians do not kill unborn babies, regardless of the sex or gender identity of the pregnant person, doctors do not remove healthy uteruses from any patients, regardless of how they identify themselves.
As for the Human Rights Campaign spokesperson’s claim that emergency rooms “sometimes” refuse to treat the twisted ankles of transgender patients, there is no evidence—including on their own website—that it or anything similar in fact happens. Furthermore, insofar as this “sometimes happens,” it seems reasonable to think that the media would focus so much attention on it that the hospital would reverse course within hours. It therefore seems highly unlikely that this alleged problem merits a governmental response.
Need for Policy Shapes the Nature of Policy Response, Definitions, and Protections
My new Heritage report argues that any justified government policy must not penalize valid forms of action and interaction or burden the rights of conscience, religion, and speech. We can see this principle in action.
Because there was such widespread, entrenched systemic and institutional racism throughout American society in the 1960s, for example, and because social and market forces were not sufficient to remedy the problem, it was appropriate for government to respond. That response was properly tailored to meet this need. It defined discrimination to include racially segregated accommodations, places of employment, and housing providers while providing thin religious liberty protections.
Because the justification for antidiscrimination laws based on race was so strong and the need was so great, the law was appropriately broad with limited exemptions.
By contrast, consider laws that address discrimination based on sex. Because the nature of sex and the history of sexism did not represent an exact parallel to racism, the law did not treat them in entirely the same ways. Discrimination was legally defined so as not to include sex-specific intimate facilities, and much broader—and in some cases total—religious liberty exemptions were included. And to this day, sex is not a protected class for federal antidiscrimination law as applied to public accommodations.
In sum, because the justification for laws against sex-based discrimination was weaker than the justification for laws against race-based discrimination, the legal response was more modest: It covered less terrain, defined discrimination more narrowly, and provided greater protection for religious liberty.
Any proposed policies intended to meet the needs of people who identify as LGBT would need to be crafted in a similar manner. Without greater evidence of the justification for specific policy responses—greater documentation of what the needs truly are—it is hard to be specific. In general, however, the need clearly seems weaker than the need for policies designed to deal with discrimination on the basis of race and sex.
A policy response would therefore need to cover less ground, target discrimination more narrowly, define discrimination accurately, and avoid undermining the rights of conscience, religion, and speech. Alas, laws proposed by liberals today do not do this. http://www.cnsnews.com/commentary/ryan-t-anderson/liberals-calling-something-discrimination-does-not-make-it-so
As I explain in a new report for The Heritage Foundation, “How to Think About Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (SOGI) Policies and Religious Freedom,” these are the laws that are being used to shutter Catholic adoption agencies, fine evangelical bakers, and force business and public facilities to allow men into women’s locker rooms.
The problem is that liberals are calling anything they dislike “discrimination.” But liberals are getting it wrong. To illustrate this, consider several different cases of putative “discrimination.” The law must be nuanced enough to capture the important differences in these cases.
Invidious and Rightly Unlawful Discrimination
Racially segregated water fountains were one form of discrimination that took race into consideration—in a context where it was completely irrelevant—and then treated blacks as second-class citizens precisely because they were black. The entire point was to classify on the basis of race in order to treat blacks as socially inferior.
As a result, such actions were rightly described as invidious race-based discrimination, and—given the entrenched, widespread, state-facilitated nature of the problem—they were rightly made unlawful.
Likewise, throughout much of American history, girls and women were not afforded educational opportunities equal to those available to boys and men. This form of discrimination took sex into consideration and then treated girls and women poorly precisely because of their sex, barring them from education in certain subjects or at certain levels despite being otherwise qualified.
As with invidious racial discrimination, such treatment took a feature (in this case, sex) into consideration precisely to treat women as less than men. The law rightly deemed such actions invidious sex-based discrimination, and—again, given the entrenched, widespread, and state-facilitated nature of the problem—Title IX of the Education Amendments was enacted to ensure that girls and women received equal educational opportunities.
Appropriate and Rightly Lawful Distinctions That Are Not Classified as Discrimination
When Title IX was enacted in 1972 and its implementing regulations were promulgated in 1975, the law made clear that sex-specific housing, bathrooms, and locker rooms were not unlawful discrimination. Such policies take sex into consideration, but they do not treat women as inferior to men or men as inferior to women. They treat both sexes equally because they take sex into consideration (they “discriminate”—in the nonpejorative sense of “distinguish”—on the basis of sex) precisely in a way that matters: by appreciating the bodily sexual difference of men and women in things such as housing, bathroom, and locker room policy.
Would we really be treating men and women equally in anything but an artificial way if we forced men and women, boys and girls, to undress in front of each other?
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in her majority opinion for the Supreme Court forcing the Virginia Military Institute to become co-ed, wrote that it “would undoubtedly require alterations necessary to afford members of each sex privacy from the other sex in living arrangements.” Yet we certainly would be treating people unequally if access to intimate facilities were based on factors wholly unrelated to privacy, such as race.
As a result, policymakers did not consider sex-specific intimate facilities as discriminatory in the first place, and laws explicitly reflected that commonsense understanding while rightly declaring racially segregated facilities to be unlawful.
The lesson here is that not all distinctions in fact should be deemed unlawful discrimination.
Not Discriminatory at All
If sex-specific intimate facilities are an example of lawful, legitimate policies that take sex into consideration, pro-life medical practices are examples of policies that are legitimate and lawful because they do not take sex into consideration at all.
That only women can get pregnant has no bearing whatsoever on the judgment of the conscientious doctor or nurse who refuses to kill the unborn. The insistence of LGBT activists that men actually can become pregnant highlights the point: Pro-life medical personnel refuse to do abortions on pregnant women and “pregnant men” (i.e. women who identify as men).
Thus, we can identify three different types of cases:
Cases of invidious discrimination, in which an irrelevant factor is taken into consideration in order to treat people poorly based on that factor, as with racially segregated water fountains;
Cases of distinctions without unlawful discrimination, in which a factor is taken into consideration precisely because it is relevant to the underlying policy and people are not treated poorly, as with sex-specific intimate facilities; and
Cases with neither distinctions nor discrimination, in which a particular factor simply does not enter into consideration, as with pro-life doctors.
Any proposed policy intended to address the documented needs of people who identify as LGBT must take these categories into account without conflation.
SOGI Discrimination: Real and Imagined
Consider a florist who refused to serve all customers who identify as LGBT simply because they identified as LGBT. That would be a case of invidious discrimination because the mere knowledge that they identify as LGBT should have no impact whatsoever on the act of the florist selling flowers, because there is no rational connection between the two.
Now consider Baronelle Stutzman, the 71-year-old grandmother who served one particular gay costumer for nearly a decade but declined to do the wedding flowers for his same-sex wedding ceremony.
The customer’s sexual orientation did not play any role in Stutzman’s decision. Her belief that marriage is a union of sexually complementary spouses does not spring from any convictions about people who identify as LGBT. When she says she can do wedding flowers only for true weddings, she makes no distinctions based on sexual orientation at all.
This is seen most clearly in the case of Catholic Charities adoption agencies. They decline to place the children entrusted to their care with same-sex couples not because of their sexual orientation, but because of the conviction that children deserve both a mother and a father.
That belief—that men and women are not interchangeable, mothers and fathers are not replaceable, the two best dads in the world cannot make up for a missing mom, and the two best moms in the world cannot make up for a missing dad—has absolutely nothing to do with sexual orientation.
Catholic Charities does not say that people who identify as LGBT cannot love or care for children; it does not take sexual orientation into consideration at all. Its preference for placing children with mothers and fathers is not an instance of discrimination based on sexual orientation—and the law should not say otherwise.
Purported gender identity discrimination presents similar problems. The Washington Post recently reported on a woman who was suing a Catholic hospital for declining to perform a sex reassignment procedure on her that entailed removing her healthy uterus. In that report, the Post captures the conflation of real and imaginary discrimination.
“What the rule says is if you provide a particular service to anybody, you can’t refuse to provide it to anyone,” said Sarah Warbelow, the legal director for the Human Rights Campaign. That means a transgender person who shows up at an emergency room with something as basic as a twisted ankle cannot be denied care, as sometimes happens, Warbelow said. That also means if a doctor provides breast reconstruction surgery or hormone therapy, those services cannot be denied to transgender patients seeking them for gender dysphoria, she said.
The two examples given, however, differ in significant ways. A hospital that refuses to treat the twisted ankles of people who identify as transgender simply because they identify as transgender would be engaging in invidious discrimination, but a hospital that declines to remove the perfectly healthy uterus of a woman who identifies as a man is not engaging in “gender identity” discrimination.
The gender identity of the patient plays no role in the decision-making process: Just as pro-life physicians do not kill unborn babies, regardless of the sex or gender identity of the pregnant person, doctors do not remove healthy uteruses from any patients, regardless of how they identify themselves.
As for the Human Rights Campaign spokesperson’s claim that emergency rooms “sometimes” refuse to treat the twisted ankles of transgender patients, there is no evidence—including on their own website—that it or anything similar in fact happens. Furthermore, insofar as this “sometimes happens,” it seems reasonable to think that the media would focus so much attention on it that the hospital would reverse course within hours. It therefore seems highly unlikely that this alleged problem merits a governmental response.
Need for Policy Shapes the Nature of Policy Response, Definitions, and Protections
My new Heritage report argues that any justified government policy must not penalize valid forms of action and interaction or burden the rights of conscience, religion, and speech. We can see this principle in action.
Because there was such widespread, entrenched systemic and institutional racism throughout American society in the 1960s, for example, and because social and market forces were not sufficient to remedy the problem, it was appropriate for government to respond. That response was properly tailored to meet this need. It defined discrimination to include racially segregated accommodations, places of employment, and housing providers while providing thin religious liberty protections.
Because the justification for antidiscrimination laws based on race was so strong and the need was so great, the law was appropriately broad with limited exemptions.
By contrast, consider laws that address discrimination based on sex. Because the nature of sex and the history of sexism did not represent an exact parallel to racism, the law did not treat them in entirely the same ways. Discrimination was legally defined so as not to include sex-specific intimate facilities, and much broader—and in some cases total—religious liberty exemptions were included. And to this day, sex is not a protected class for federal antidiscrimination law as applied to public accommodations.
In sum, because the justification for laws against sex-based discrimination was weaker than the justification for laws against race-based discrimination, the legal response was more modest: It covered less terrain, defined discrimination more narrowly, and provided greater protection for religious liberty.
Any proposed policies intended to meet the needs of people who identify as LGBT would need to be crafted in a similar manner. Without greater evidence of the justification for specific policy responses—greater documentation of what the needs truly are—it is hard to be specific. In general, however, the need clearly seems weaker than the need for policies designed to deal with discrimination on the basis of race and sex.
A policy response would therefore need to cover less ground, target discrimination more narrowly, define discrimination accurately, and avoid undermining the rights of conscience, religion, and speech. Alas, laws proposed by liberals today do not do this. http://www.cnsnews.com/commentary/ryan-t-anderson/liberals-calling-something-discrimination-does-not-make-it-so
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That belief—that men and women are not interchangeable, mothers and fathers are not replaceable, the two best dads in the world cannot make up for a missing mom, and the two best moms in the world cannot make up for a missing dad—has absolutely nothing to do with sexual orientation.
Catholic Charities does not say that people who identify as LGBT cannot love or care for children; it does not take sexual orientation into consideration at all. Its preference for placing children with mothers and fathers is not an instance of discrimination based on sexual orientation—and the law should not say otherwise.
Of course it discrimination based on sexual orientation. There is no other way to interpret it. They can claim they don't want to do it because of their religious beliefs against same-sex couples, but they can not claim that it's not based on sexual orientation. That is the Catholic Church telling a bald-faced lie.
Like liberals claiming that affirmative action isn't racial discrimination.
Like conservatives claiming that affirmative action is racist...Your colors are showing again Sean.
Right Kavika. Discriminating on the basis of race isn't racist.
Next Kavika claims water isn't wet and up is down.
Next Kavika claims water isn't wet and up is down.
No. That would be Sean Spicer.
Sean, do you have any idea why affirmative action was instituted?
It was to level the playing field for minorities. It would seem that you want to go back to the days of overt discrimination.
Mighty white of you Sean.
If something discriminates on the basis of race, it discriminates on the basis of race.
You've basically given the game away when you try to justify the reasons behind the government discriminating on the basis of race rather than making the absurd argument that the government doesn't discriminate. "Good intentions" are irrelevant as the issue of whether the government discriminates on the basis of race.
It would seem that you want to go back to the days of overt discrimination.
Now you have to resort to making things up. Pathetic.
We are actually in the days of overt discrimination though. I'm trying to end them, while you fight for discrimination.
Sean,
Are you saying that what I believe your calling reverse discrimination, shouldn't be used to fix past discrimination and level the playing field?
If that is correct, please tell me what would have ended the discrimination that existed against minorities?
If, as you say affirmative action is discriminatory what would you suggest it be replaced with so that there is a level playing field?
The good will of the non minorities didn't do, is there any reason to believe that this has changed.
Actually in the top tier schools, minorities are more under represented today than they were in 1995.
So there are a couple of points to consider. How to improve the on the number of minorities students at these schools. Drop what little good that it has done at the top tier schools, or continue it to get a small number of minorities into these schools.
It's a situation brought about the decades/centuries of discrimination against minorities.
I'm presenting some question that you may or may not want to respond to, Sean.
If your total argument is that whites are being discriminated against, it a three legged stool Sean. You have to look, or not. at the total problem.
Again the problems started with discrimination by non minorities against minorities. That Sean, is a fact.
discrimination shouldn't be used to fix past discrimination and level the playing field?
Correct. Past racial discrimination doesn't justify the government continuing to engage in racial discrimination.
If that is correct, please tell me what would have ended the discrimination that existed against minorities?
Enforcing the 14th Amendment.
affirmative action is discriminatory what would you suggest it be replaced with so that there is a level playing field?
A playing field where the government doesn't discriminate on the basis of race.
''Enforcing the 14th Amendment.'' That didn't work out.
''A playing field where the government doesn't discriminate on the basis of race.''
So that would allow the corporations/schools/businesses to have continued their discrimination based on race.
Homosexuality is a behavior not an immutable characteristic like race. As a behavior, people can disapprove of it like any other behavior. However, providing a service is not approval. I can see why a church shouldn't be forced to bless an abomination before God but why can't a baker who provides a public service just bake a cake like he does for everyone else? I fully support the baker's right to tell the couple how abominable he finds them, post bible passages all over the place, decline to mix and match figurines, and refuse to write touching same-sex sentiments on the cake.
Homosexuality is a behavior not an immutable characteristic like race.
Homosexuality is something a person is. It is more then a behavior, which implies that it is a choice, when it is not. Gay people are gay people because they are gay people. To a gay person it is as immutable as race.
Homosexuality is a behavior not an immutable characteristic like race.
Homosexuality is something a person is. It is more then a behavior, which implies that it is a choice, when it is not. Gay people are gay people because they are gay people. To a gay person it is as immutable as race.
You think it's an identity; I think it's a choice like any other behavior (whether or not they choose to curb it). And, like any other behavior, we should be able to disapprove of it. Still, I think homosexuals should be able to buy a wedding cake in a public business and the baker should be free to tell them how revolting he finds the idea of them marrying each other. Everybody wins.
I have no real certain idea what causes a person to be gay. I can only suppose it's that same as what causes a person to be heterosexual. I am not a heterosexual because I chose to have that sexual orientation, it's just the orientation that I have. So since I didn't choose to be heterosexual I know it is not a choice. My son is gay and I am sure he could not tell you why he has the sexual orientation that he does and I would suppose neither could his husband. Neither one of them chose to be gay anymore then I chose to be heterosexual. I just am heterosexual and they just are gay. The concept of choice has nothing to do with it. I don't believe you can disapprove of someone simply for being who and what they are.
I have no real certain idea what causes a person to be gay. I can only suppose it's that same as what causes a person to be heterosexual. I am not a heterosexual because I chose to have that sexual orientation, it's just the orientation that I have . . .
The same thing could be said of any sexually deviant behavior. I simply do not buy into the notion that this behavior is normal, natural, or genetic. I'm not trying to be offensive to you or your son but this is one issue on which we will never agree.
Then we are at an impasse. Agreed?
Oh and I forgot to add that they are both wonderful people, a great, loving and normal couple. They work hard. Pay their bills and taxes. Go shopping. Do all of the same things any other couple does. I love my son and his husband who is a great addition to our family. Even if he is a Miami Dolphins fan.
I agree to impasse. And I have no reason to doubt that your son is a nice person.
The 1ofmany plan: You should tell your son and his husband that they have a mental problem, and suggest a therapist that will make them straight. Be nice to them, but condescend until they are straight.
The 1ofmany plan: You should tell your son and his husband that they have a mental problem, and suggest a therapist that will make them straight. Be nice to them, but condescend until they are straight.
I didn't suggest that Randy do anything.
The Hal plan: tell his daughter she's just fine when she declares herself to be a man and then pisses all over herself trying to use a urinal.
I didn't suggest that Randy do anything.
That's true Hal. 1ofmany and I declared an impasse and it would be nice if you would respect that also. Just a request.
It's a little odd that you thought it would end any other way than an impasse in the first place. Have you two met?
Even if he is a Miami Dolphins fan.
Being a Miami Dolphins fan is not a choice-- they are born that way. (Its Genetic).
Actually they are racially inferior!
We agree.
You may have me on that one. Of course I'm a Detroit Lions fan which may mean that I genetically lean toward S&M.
What's all this about everyone having to be equal? Everyone is not equal. Some are smarter than others and some are born into better family situations than others.
What I've found is the problem arises when with all these inequalities, there is an idea everyone should end up equal and that reminds me of the video of Kitty Whitmann, the Austrian who said when Hitler was elected by the Austrian people, everyone received equal pay, no matter how equal or not equal they were.
I've found it to be the case quite often those who had the least had to work harder than quite a few of the blessed ones and became more productive citizens because of their shortcomings.
Some of the biggest victims seem to have become quite successful. You know what I think? I think it is because they had to work harder. I think they should be taking credit for their successes and stop claiming victimhoid.
Today's average citizen becomes better than others simply by applying themselves to whatever degree it takes to excell above others around them. The only person holding anyone down in todays society is oneself.
Don't expect equality on the front end and definitely don"t expect equality on the backend unless you can accept a decline in everyone's successes in life.
I've found it to be the case quite often those who had the least had to work harder than quite a few of the blessed ones and became more productive citizens because of their shortcomings.
Some of the biggest victims seem to have become quite successful. You know what I think? I think it is because they had to work harder. I think they should be taking credit for their successes and stop claiming victimhoid.
I totally agree. There are some very wealthy people who want the best for their kids-- and give them whatever they want from early on.
There is also another trend among some of the wiser wealthy parents-- they leave vast wealth to their kids-- with one provision. The kids can't touch a cent of it 'till they'reover 40 (or even over 50-- or older). The kids have to work for everything that have for much of their life.
Guess which approach tends to produce mostly lazy, self-indulgent bums? And how do you think the other group mostly turns out?
Bill gates says that while his children will not be poor, they will also not be as wealthy as some might think because he plans on donating almost everything he has to charity.
My grandfather on my mother's side (who immigrated from Finland as a child) retired as a millionaire and every time he caught a cold or something the vultures in the family would compete to see who could be the nicest to him. Of course he saw right through it. What they didn't know was that he was going to spend as much of it a possible on a long retirement. Granted he sent my Uncle Herb through law school, but he always joked that he saved more then what it cost him in free legal and investment services. I told him after his second heart attack that he should give all of his money away, after making sure grandma was taken care of of course and not let any of them have any of it. In the end he did give nearly everything to The American Heart Association. All of his kids got $100,000 each, which is nothing to sneeze at, but was pennies compared to the total estate. I always respected him for that.
Are you familiar with "The Giving Pledge"?
(LINK)
No I was not aware of them. I don't think my grandfather qualifies as one of the world's riches people though. Although when he came to the US as a child from Finland his family had little money and his father worked n the copper mines in Northern Michigan. He decided he did want that life so he moved into lower Michigan and actually started making money distilling and selling illegal gin during Prohibition and he used that money to start his road contracting business when Prohibition was over.
I've found it to be the case quite often those who had the least had to work harder than quite a few of the blessed ones and became more productive citizens because of their shortcomings.
Some of the biggest victims seem to have become quite successful. You know what I think? I think it is because they had to work harder. I think they should be taking credit for their successes and stop claiming victimhoid.
Which is why some immigrants from terrible situations in their country of origins turn put so well. They've had to struggle to get here...and they appreciate the opportunty to work hard and get rewarded, something that was impossible in their countries of origin.
Here's an interesting fact:
The Kauffman report said “immigrants are twice as likely to become entrepreneurs as native-born Americans.”
More fascinating info on the success of immigrants who succeeded here:
A Record Number Of U.S. Billionaires Are Immigrants
A friend of mine whose family emigrated from Argentina to the United States when he was a kid recently told me he could never have built his small business back home because he wasn’t born to the right class. No one in the United States cares about his background, he said. They cared about what he could do.
My friend isn’t rich, but he is comfortable, with a full-time job and a robust furniture resale business. It’s a tale worth telling as Forbes Magazine on Tuesday released its annual list of the 400 richest Americans , a record 42 of whom are immigrants from 21 countries.
“There is no other country on the planet where you or your parents can show up and with a lot of hard work create huge wealth within one generation,” said businessman Raul Fernandez, who was born in Washington to immigrant parents from Cuba and from Ecuador.
(READ IT ALL)
When I was stationed in D.C. and living in Virginia, people would complain about the Indians owning all the 7-11's. I met some of them. They scraped as much money as they could put together, bought a franchise, the entire family would work 24x7 to make it prosperous, then they would buy another. When you would ask an unemployed American why they wouldn't take a job in a 7-11, invariably the answer would be it was beneath them.
People that immigrate here legally, come mostly from places where there are not much in the way of opportunities, those folks come here to make their families successful - the true American Dream.