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It’s time to accept that the US supreme court is illegitimate and must be replaced

  

Category:  News & Politics

Via:  s  •  11 months ago  •  21 comments

It’s time to accept that the US supreme court is illegitimate and must be replaced

S E E D E D   C O N T E N T


T he justices of the US   supreme court   – even its conservatives – have traditionally valued their institution’s own standing. John Roberts, the current US chief justice, has always been praised – even by liberals – as a staunch advocate of the court’s image as a neutral arbiter. For decades, Americans believed the court soared above the fray of partisan contestation.

No more .


In   Donald Trump ’s second term, the supreme court’s conservative supermajority has seized the opportunity to empower the nation’s chief executive. In response, public approval of the court has   collapsed . The question is what it means for liberals to catch up to this new reality of a court that willingly tanks its own legitimacy. Eager to realize cherished goals of assigning power to the president and arrogating as much for itself, the conservative justices seemingly no longer care what the public or the legal community think of the court’s actions. Too often, though, liberals are responding with nostalgia for a court that cares about its high standing. There is a much better option: to grasp the opportunity to set right the supreme court’s role in US democracy.

Attention to the body’s legitimacy surged in the decades after the extraordinary discussion on the topic in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey   –   the 1992 case that memorably preserved the abortion rights minted in Roe v Wade   despite recent conservative additions to the court. “The Court’s power lies in its legitimacy,” former justices Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day O’Connor and David Souter explained in their joint opinion, “a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s law means and to declare what it demands”. The fact of popular acceptance of the institution’s role was itself a constitutional and legal concern.

Compared with the prior quarter-century, when they angled for just one justice (often Kennedy) to swing to their side, it was already clear as Trump’s first term ended how much was going to change with Amy Coney Barrett’s conservative substitution for Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Yet liberal justices generally   proceeded   as if their conservative peers would continue to take their own institution’s legitimacy seriously. They focused on warning conservatives against further eroding it. The   dissent in Dobbs v Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which removed the federal right to abortion, is a classic example. The liberal justices lionized Kennedy and other conservatives for refusing to overturn Roe v Wade out of the need they cited in Casey   to maintain the supreme court’s image.

That was then. In Trump’s second term, the court has ceded to him near total control over federal spending, even as the president is now openly threatening to withhold funds from “blue” states and projects not aligned with administrative “priorities”. Authorized by the court to engage in racial profiling, masked federal agents continue to descend upon “Democrat-run” cities, subjecting Latinos and now Somalis to ongoing abuse.

Most recently, the court hinted at its plan to declare most, if not all “independent” agencies unconstitutional, allowing Trump to fire members of the Federal Trade Commission and the National Labor Relations Board – though Chief Justice Roberts did suggest that the Federal Reserve might be different, drawing sighs from legal commentators (and sighs of relief from investors). The conservative justices appear wholly unbothered by the howls that the court is no more than a partisan institution, turning their destructive attention next to what remains of the Voting Rights Act.

Yet with the conservative justices shattering the supreme court’s non-partisan image during Trump’s second term, liberals are not adjusting much. The liberal justices –   Ketanji Brown Jackson ,   Elena Kagan   and   Sonia Sotomayor   – have become much more aggressive in their dissents. But they disagree with one another about how far to concede that their conservative colleagues have given up any concern for institutional legitimacy. Encouragingly, Jackson pivoted to “warning the public that the boat is sinking” – as journalist Jodi Kantor put it in a much-noticed reported   piece . Jackson’s fellow liberals, though, did not follow her in this regard, worrying her strategy of pulling the “fire alarm” was “diluting” their collective “impact”.

Similarly, many liberal lawyers have focused their criticism on the   manner   in which the supreme court has advanced its noxious agenda – issuing major rulings via the “shadow” docket, without full-dress lawyering, and leaving out reasoning in support of its decisions.

What appears to matter for such respectful institutionalists, most prominently the liberal professor Stephen   Vladeck , is that the errant, reactionary justices rationalize   their disastrous rulings. But aside from the fact that few Americans read their opinions in the first place, the objection presupposes that a more enlightened despotism ought to be the goal – that the justices trashing the respect Americans once had for them merely need to explain themselves, instead of giving up their power to inflict so much ongoing harm.

Some liberals worry that concluding the supreme court is beyond redemption is too close to “nihilism” about the constitution, or even about law itself. In the aftermath of Trump’s re-election, Professor Kate Shaw   remarked : “I don’t think abandoning the constitution in the course of abandoning institutions is the right way forward or is something that we can survive.” Vladeck   cautioned   similarly against “doomerism”, warning the “rule of law” in the United States might “struggle to survive” the “emergence of any kind of popular consensus that law increasingly doesn’t matter”.

Such qualms suggest some can’t imagine an alternative to a legitimate supreme court even once the institution itself has abandoned that role. Much like in the   early 20th century , Americans today are responding to a series of institutional failures with an extended period of constitutional rethinking. Tracing many of those failures to the undemocratic features of our written constitution – the electoral college and the Senate, most notably – reformers are proposing creative   solutions   or   workarounds   that might move us in the direction of an actual democracy.

Similarly, progressives are increasingly converging on the idea of both expanding and “ disempowering ” federal courts. Attentive to the reality that the supreme court especially is not and rarely has been their friend, left-leaning advocates are finding ways to empower ordinary people, trading the hollow hope of judicial power for the promise of popular rule.

To label as “nihilists” those sketching an alternate, more democratic future is, in other words, not only mistaken but outright bizarre. Rather than adhere to the same institutionalist strategies that helped our current crisis, reformers must insist on remaking institutions like the   US supreme court   so that Americans don’t have to suffer future decades of oligarchy-facilitating rule that makes a parody of the democracy they were promised.

In Trump’s second term, the Republican-appointed majority on the supreme court has brought their institution to the brink of illegitimacy. Far from pulling it back from the edge, our goal has to be to push it off.


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Sean Treacy
Professor Principal
1  seeder  Sean Treacy    11 months ago

These are professors at the two most elite law schools publishing a plea to destroy a branch of government in a mainstream progressive newspaper.

If there's ever a doubt why some people aren't  rending their garments over Trump renaming a building, look at the alternative.

 
 
 
bugsy
Professor Participates
1.1  bugsy  replied to  Sean Treacy @1    11 months ago
Trump renaming a building

I went back and looked where the left was outraged when Nevada, a blue state, changed the name of the LV airport to the Harry Reid airport.

Funny thing is....I couldn't find it.

I would say I wonder why...but I don't

 
 
 
Hallux
Professor Principal
1.1.1  Hallux  replied to  bugsy @1.1    11 months ago
Harry Reid airport.

Formerly known as McCarran International ... McCarran was a virulent antisemite. As to Harry Reid, he was already dead when the name changed ... sorta like JFK and everyone with a post office named after him/her.

 
 
 
bugsy
Professor Participates
1.1.2  bugsy  replied to  Hallux @1.1.1    11 months ago
McCarran was a virulent antisemite.

And a democrat.

"As to Harry Reid, he was already dead when the name changed ... sorta like JFK and everyone with a post office named after him/her."

I'm not defending the name change. To my knowledge, there has not been any high profile democrats that use the reasoning that Trump is still alive to complain about the name change.

All we hear about is the name change. 

If Biden or Obama did the same, the left would be saluting it as a great honor.

 
 
 
Sean Treacy
Professor Principal
1.1.3  seeder  Sean Treacy  replied to  Hallux @1.1.1    11 months ago
McCarran was a virulent antisemite

Given JFK's failings, are you arguing for the name change? 

 
 
 
Tacos!
Professor Guide
1.1.4  Tacos!  replied to  bugsy @1.1    11 months ago
I went back and looked where the left was outraged when Nevada, a blue state, changed the name of the LV airport to the Harry Reid airport.

Maybe because it was done lawfully.

 
 
 
Bob Nelson
Professor Guide
2  Bob Nelson    11 months ago

When I said that the Dems, if they win in 2026, must give Roberts the choice between getting back to actual law, or getting packed... you reacted negatively, to say the least. Have you come around?

Or is the difference that you want conservatives to rein in the SC craziness? Is it "who" that's important, rather than "what"?

 
 
 
Sean Treacy
Professor Principal
2.1  seeder  Sean Treacy  replied to  Bob Nelson @2    11 months ago
if they win in 2026, must give Roberts the choice between getting back to actual law, or getting packed... you reacted negatively, to say the least. 

No, your comment was they have to resign or get packed.  

And yes, I react negatively to extortion 

Have you come around?

No, I posted this as  an  example of how  elite progressives manage to make Trump seem moderate by comparison. 

 
 
 
bugsy
Professor Participates
2.2  bugsy  replied to  Bob Nelson @2    11 months ago
must give Roberts the choice between getting back to actual law

When has Roberts NOT "back to actual law"?

 
 
 
TᵢG
Professor Principal
3  TᵢG    11 months ago

When the SCotUS ruled this last year:

Held: Under our constitutional structure of separated powers, the nature of Presidential power entitles a former President to absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions within his conclusive and preclusive constitutional authority. And he is entitled to at least presumptive immunity from prosecution for all his official acts. There is no immunity for unofficial acts.

That was the point where I lost trust that this SCotUS is NOT overly tied to partisan politics.   Other courts have made bad decisions, but after the Roe v. Wade decision, this court seems to have given up on its attempt to be non-partisan.   When they directly violated the CotUS with the 2024 immunity decision, I think it is quite fair game for such criticism.

The SCotUS just invented immunity that does not exist anywhere in the CotUS.   Not in Article II, and in direct contradiction to Article 1 §3.7:

Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.

The SCotUS increased the power of the presidency.   That is beyond their scope and violates the spirit and letter of the CotUS.   No person is above the law ... especially the top individual charged with "preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution".

And we can see the effects of this since the current PotUS is cavalierly breaking the law and forcing courts to spend time dealing with a seemingly endless stream of legal and constitutional violations.

 
 
 
Sean Treacy
Professor Principal
3.1  seeder  Sean Treacy  replied to  TᵢG @3    11 months ago

at was the point where I lost trust that this SCotUS is NOT overly tied to partisan politics.

So you'd prefer a system where the President can be criminally charged for taking Constitutional acts? 

nd in direct contradiction to Article 1 §3.7:

That's simply not true.  You should read the article again.

he SCotUS increased the power of the presidency

Explain how a ruling that the President cannot go to jail for exercising the powers of the Presidency set out in the Constitution "expands the power" of the Presidency. 

we can see the effects of this since the current PotUS is cavalierly breaking the law and forcing courts to spend time dealing with a seemingly endless stream of legal and constitutional violations.

Even more factually indefensible. 

 
 
 
TᵢG
Professor Principal
3.1.1  TᵢG  replied to  Sean Treacy @3.1    11 months ago
So you'd prefer a system where the President can be criminally charged for taking Constitutional acts? 

No.   Attempt to understand what I wrote rather than leap to a ridiculous extreme.   The CotUS was working just fine regarding presidential immunity.   The SCotUS gratuitously increased the protections and thus power of the presidency.

You should read the article again.

Take your own advice.   Further, this is not merely my opinion.   It takes no effort for you or anyone else to read plenty of constitutional analysis on this very issue.

Even more factually indefensible. 

Of course, you just ignore all that is right in front of your nose when it comes to Trump's misdeeds.

 
 
 
TᵢG
Professor Principal
3.1.2  TᵢG  replied to  Sean Treacy @3.1    11 months ago

I asked ChatGPT to give you a headstart for you edification:

Below is a summary of the main legal criticisms of the 2024 Supreme Court decision in Trump v. United States on presidential immunity, along with links to supporting legal commentary and arguments from reputable sources.

Summary of the Legal Criticism

1. It weakens criminal accountability and democratic checks
Critics argue the decision undermines core constitutional principles by shielding presidents from prosecution for official acts, potentially placing them “above the law” and weakening accountability mechanisms essential to a constitutional republic. Many scholars and observers see this as a threat to the rule of law and separation of powers because it limits the judiciary’s role in checking executive misconduct. ( Brennan Center for Justice )

2. It expands presidential power beyond precedent
Legal experts have noted that the ruling deviates from historical and judicial practice. The Court’s broad conception of immunity is seen as sidestepping established roles for Congress and the courts, expanding executive authority in unprecedented ways that may leave the President less accountable even for serious wrongdoing. ( Harvard Law Review )

3. Issues with constitutional text and structure
Critics argue the decision lacks a strong basis in the text of the Constitution, which does not explicitly grant criminal immunity for official acts. Some scholars contend that the decision effectively rewrote separation-of-powers principles rather than applying them, raising concerns that it substitutes judicial policymaking for constitutional interpretation. ( Harvard Law Review )

4. Judicial legitimacy concerns, including from within the Court
Justice Sonia Sotomayor (dissenting) criticized the ruling as posing a risk to the Supreme Court’s legitimacy by suggesting that no one, even a president, should be above the law — a fundamental constitutional norm. ( Fox News )


Supporting Links to Legal Arguments and Criticism

1. NYU Law Forum critiques the ruling
Panelists at an NYU Law Forum discussed how the decision departs from precedent and raises serious questions about presidential versus congressional power and civil accountability.
Link: NYU Law Forum on Presidential Immunity Critiques (law.nyu.edu)

2. Harvard Law Review assessment
A detailed legal analysis argues the Court’s reasoning erases Congress’s role in assessing presidential criminal immunity and shifts the balance of accountability toward the presidency and courts.
Link: Disqualification, Immunity, and the Presidency (Harvard Law Review)

3. Brennan Center analysis
The Brennan Center frames the decision as undermining democratic accountability and rule of law by granting broad immunity for official acts.
Link: Supreme Court’s Presidential Immunity Ruling Undermines Democracy (brennancenter.org)

4. Historical and constitutional context at Oyez
Background on the case showing how the Court’s expansion of immunity fits into broader debates about executive power and limits of prosecution.
Link: Trump v. United States — Case Summary (Oyez)


Examples of Specific Criticisms

  • Rule of law risk: The decision may allow high-level officials to act without fear of criminal consequences for official acts. ( Brennan Center for Justice )

  • Judicial legitimacy: Sotomayor warned the Court’s legitimacy suffers when it appears to exempt presidents from normal legal accountability. ( Fox News )

  • Structural imbalance: Academic commentary emphasizes that the Court sidelined Congress and expanded executive authority beyond traditional limits. ( Harvard Law Review )


If you want, I can also provide links to dissenting opinions and congressional commentary about this decision, or a brief citation list formatted for academic use .
 
 
 
Sean Treacy
Professor Principal
3.1.3  seeder  Sean Treacy  replied to  TᵢG @3.1.1    11 months ago
No

But that's the implication of your argument. You explicitly pointed out as objectionable the Court's language  holding the President is criminally immune for taking constitutional acts. Why did you choose that portion to highlight if you agree with it? So do you agree with the highlighted text or not? 

The Biden Admin and Trump's lawyers both agree with the Court's statement you excerpted.  Funny that you find the court's statement that both Trump and the Biden admin agreed with as worth signaling out to represent what you claim to be some historical attack on the Constitution. 

 The CotUS was working just fine regarding presidential immunity

This was the first ruling on this specific issue. In fact, it's result is dictated by the Fitzgerald case granting the President civil immunity, so it's hard to imagine a world where you can claim the "Court was just fine on presidential immunity" and still claim the Trump case is some earth shattering mistake. If Trump is wrong, so is the unanimously decided Fitzgerald case, not to mention Chief Justice Marshall's most famous opinion in Marbury.   

Your position that the court was just fine until now is incoherent. If the  Trump case  is egregiously wrong, so is every case since Marbury that granted the President any hint of immunity. 

 akes no effort for you or anyone else to read plenty of constitutional analysis on this very issue.

Read the article. It's own language defeats you. 

 
 
 
TᵢG
Professor Principal
3.1.4  TᵢG  replied to  Sean Treacy @3.1.3    11 months ago
But that's the implication of your argument. 

No, that is you dishonestly engaging in extreme exaggeration.

In fact, it's result is dictated by the Fitzgerald case granting the President civil immunity, ...

No it was not dictated (how naive).   If so, then the Fitzgerald case would have dealt with criminal as well as civil.   The two are very different.  Civil is inherently subjective whereas criminal deals with the law.   Protections for PotUS from frivolous subjective lawsuits and politically-motivated lawsuits are very different from allowing a PotUS to flat out break the law and violate the CotUS.

One of countless legal analyses on this issue:

Chief Justice Roberts’s application of Nixon v. Fitzgerald similarly went well beyond what that precedent supported . 149  In Fitzgerald, the Court had insisted that determining the scope of presidential immunity required “balanc[ing] the constitutional weight of the interest to be served” by a judicial action “against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.” 150  Fitzgerald had good company in insisting on a balancing analysis; that was the approach the Court applied nearly a decade earlier in United States v. Nixon, 151  in concluding that a grand jury subpoena trumped Nixon’s executive privilege claims. 152  And the Roberts Court itself has applied a balancing analysis in assessing presidential immunity and privilege claims. 153  Further, a central characteristic of these decisions is the Court’s fact-based analysis and sensitivity to interests on both sides of the ledger. Thus, the fact that Fitzgerald involved private suits for money damages was critical to the Court’s analysis , 154  with the Court noting that “the President would be an easily identifiable target for [private] suits” 155  and that “ there is a lesser public interest in actions for civil damages than . . . criminal prosecutions.” 156  More recently, in Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 157  the Court — also in an opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts — carefully assessed both Congress’s need for information and the particular dangers posed by congressional subpoenas for presidential information before establishing a multi-factor inquiry to govern congressional requests for such information. 158

Trump v. United States, by contrast, engaged in faux balancing at best. 159   Chief Justice Roberts barely acknowledged there were “countervailing interests” in play, let alone took seriously the constitutional importance of ensuring that criminal actions by the President not go unpunished. 160  Instead, he focused almost entirely on the danger that presidential vigor and boldness might be chilled and the President distracted. 161  On Chief Justice Roberts’s telling, the fact that criminal liability was in play rather than civil damages only made the risk of distorting presidential decisionmaking worse. 162  A clear sign of the Chief Justice’s one-sided approach was his selective elevation of half of Fitzgerald’s balancing test — the part that considers “dangers of intrusion on the . . . Executive Branch” — as the sole measure of when presumptive immunity applies. 163  Equally revealing was his conclusion that the presence of any such danger with respect to an official act, no matter how attenuated, meant the President was immune. 164  This analysis marks a stark contrast with the approach the Court took just a few years ago in Trump v. Vance, 165  when Chief Justice Roberts wrote a majority opinion for the Court rejecting absolute immunity or heightened protection for the President from state judicial process. 166  In Vance, the Chief Justice downplayed the risk of distraction, harassment, or other burdens on the President and emphasized “the public interest in fair and effective law enforcement.” 167   Thus, Trump v. United States not only lacked precedential support for how it applied the governing framework it laid out, but that framework itself went beyond what quite recent prior decisions had established.

The decision is also deeply flawed from an institutional perspective because of how it largely erased Congress from analysis of presidential immunity. Such erasure resulted in part from Chief Justice Roberts’s tying presidential immunity to instances of exclusive presidential authority, because by definition Congress lacks power to regulate in those instances. But the Court also sidelined Congress on immunity in contexts of concurrent congressional authority, with the Chief Justice invoking Congress’s legislative handiwork only in determining the boundary between official and unofficial actions. 168  The Chief Justice made no reference to Congress’s views on questions such as whether presumptive immunity should be overcome, even when the President is acting using power delegated and otherwise regulated by Congress. Nor did Chief Justice Roberts signal that the analysis might be different, or that Congress might have a greater say over the scope of immunity, in the extraordinary context where a President has been impeached. Instead, under Trump v. United States the power to determine whether the President is immune from criminal liability appears to rest almost entirely with the courts.

This sidelining of Congress from presidential immunity determinations stands in significant contrast to the Court’s affirmation of Congress’s centrality in Anderson. 169   It is also a marked difference from Fitzgerald, where the Court emphasized that it was only deciding the President’s civil damages immunity “in the absence of explicit affirmative action by Congress” subjecting the President to suit. 170  Congress’s exclusion from the immunity analysis in Trump v. United States is also notable given the obvious policy basis for assessments of presumptive immunity. Here many of the presidential actions at issue are ones that rest on congressional grants of authority or are actions that Congress has authority to regulate. 171  As a result, judgments about how to value energetic enforcement compared to accountability and the risks of harm from law violations are not simply constitutional questions; they also represent policy choices on which Congress’s views seem particularly relevant.

Moreover, the Court had before it alternative approaches that would have preserved a more significant role for Congress while still limiting presidential criminal liability. Concurring, Justice Barrett emphasized the importance of assessing “whether the relevant criminal statute reaches the President’s official conduct” before determining whether the President would be immune if it did. 172  She argued that this “threshold question of statutory interpretation is a nontrivial step,” 173  noting that such interpretation may reveal that Congress intended a public authority exception or in other ways may have exempted the President from a “broadly worded statute.” 174  Even more protective of the President would be the clear statement rule that Trump offered as an alternative to his broad claim of absolute immunity, under which generally applicable criminal laws should not be read to apply to the President without a clear congressional statement to that effect. 175  Such a clear statement approach had support in the Court’s precedent 176  and would have allowed it to avoid the constitutional question of immunity. Yet the Court chose instead to hold that the Constitution mandates broad presidential criminal immunity. It is hard not to see the Court as intentionally excluding Congress and providing a constitutional framework that would take the question of presidential immunity largely out of Congress’s hands. 177

A final point worth considering is how Trump v. United States will impact accountability mechanisms within the executive branch. Chief Justice Roberts expressed deep skepticism about executive branch protections against prosecutorial abuse, arguing that criminal immunity was necessary to prevent “an Executive Branch that cannibalizes itself, with each successive President free to prosecute his predecessors.” 178   Absent from the opinion, however, was any consideration of how such immunity might affect internal executive branch checks that seek to prevent the President from engaging in unlawful conduct in the first place. Although the criminal trial context of Trump v. United States frames the decision as focusing more on external controls on the President, in practice internal and external checks are not so separable. In particular, executive branch lawyers draw on judicial decisions prohibiting certain conduct to dissuade agency leaders and White House staff from pursuing courses of action that would likely be held unlawful. 179

By inoculating the President against criminal liability, Trump v. United States makes it harder for executive branch lawyers to push back on unlawful presidential action. How much harder is unclear and will depend in large part on the decision’s implications for officials below the President. In practice, suits against the President directly are rare. 180  Instead, suits against lower officials for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as these officials’ potential criminal and damages liability for legal violations, are the central mechanisms for enforcing legal constraints on the executive branch. 181  If the decision is read as immunizing lower officials against suits for declaratory and injunctive relief or criminal liability, it could profoundly undermine both internal and external mechanisms for ensuring the executive branch operates lawfully.

The SCotUS created a new protection that allowed a PotUS to flat out break the law and violate the CotUS.

Read the article. It's own language defeats you. 

A feeble claim illustrating that you have nothing but 'nuh-uh'.

 
 
 
Sean Treacy
Professor Principal
3.1.5  seeder  Sean Treacy  replied to  TᵢG @3.1.4    11 months ago
No, that is you dishonestly engaging in extreme exaggeration.

Lol.  You claimed that this case is not just wrong, but so egregiously wrong as to call into question the legitimacy of the entire Supreme Court and to highlight just how terrible the decision was you selected a section of the holding that both parties to the case agreed with.   Your chosen example is  a position so mainstream that both parties to a Supreme Court case agreed with it yet you think it's worth burning the court down over. 

Okay.

No it was not dictated (how naive).   If so, then the Fitzgerald case would have dealt with criminal as well as civi

Speaking of naive.  Let me explain the basics of how our system works.  Courts rule on the issues before them.  Fitzgerald was a civil case. For the Fitzgerald Court to have used a civil matter to pronounce a ruling on a criminal matter not before would have been highly improper. But the logic of the Fitzgerald case, of course, applies here and your failure to see that makes me believe you don't understand the dissent. 

If the dissent is to be believed, Presidential privilege doesn't exist because it's not in the Constitution.  If so, Fitzgerald is wrongly decided and so are 200 plus years of precedent going back going back to the foundation of our republic. Every other case that relies on the principle of the  separation of powers between the branches of government has been wrongly decided.  Every single private discussion the President has when discussing a potential action is discoverable by Congress or a Court. The President has no confidentially privilege as its not in the Constitutional  either.  If progressives want to throw the baby out with the bath water to get Trump, do it honestly. 

Claiming the Court was "just fine" when it held that Presidential privilege exists even though it's not in the Constitution  and then to turn around and claim destroys the Court to apply the same logic when deciding a  criminal case is simply dishonest. 

 
 
 
TᵢG
Professor Principal
3.1.6  TᵢG  replied to  Sean Treacy @3.1.5    11 months ago
You claimed that this case is not just wrong, but so egregiously wrong as to call into question the legitimacy of the entire Supreme Court and to highlight just how terrible the decision was you selected a section of the holding that both parties to the case agreed with. 

Looks like you are not ever going to actually read what I posted.   Even when I take the time to provide one of many legal analyses and highlight key sentences in blue.

For the Fitzgerald Court to have used a civil matter to pronounce a ruling on a criminal matter not before would have been highly improper.

Point of fact then is that you recognize that the Fitzgerald case was NOT about criminal activity.   So you trying to view this as a precedence for criminal immunity is ridiculous.   As my sources noted.

 
 
 
Sean Treacy
Professor Principal
3.1.7  seeder  Sean Treacy  replied to  TᵢG @3.1.6    11 months ago
ooks like you are not ever going to actually read what I posted. 

I'm trying to get you to provide a coherent explanation of your position. I've read the primary sources.  How does chatgpt explain your own thought process? 

Point of fact then is that you recognize that the Fitzgerald case was NOT about criminal activity. 

Of course. I never suggested it was. It's about the Court granting the President an immunity without a  textual basis in the Constitution, the same logic it applied in the Trump case. 

Here's your beloved Chatgpt explaining  how your own claim that the Court's position on immunity was "just fine" before the Trump case is simply not reconcilable    with believing the Trump case is some radical attack on the Court's credibility:

The Trump dissent’s core premise is:
Courts should not create sweeping presidential immunities absent clear constitutional grounding, especially where doing so places the President above the criminal law.

From that premise, several implications follow:

  • If textual silence is decisive, then Fitzgerald’s immunity is on shaky ground.

  • The dissent’s emphasis on express grants of immunity elsewhere in the Constitution cuts directly against Fitzgerald’s method.

  • The dissent repeatedly warns against functional, policy-driven immunity doctrines that override accountability.

So, yes: taken seriously, the dissent’s logic undermines Fitzgerald.

 

 
 
 
TᵢG
Professor Principal
3.1.8  TᵢG  replied to  Sean Treacy @3.1.7    11 months ago
I'm trying to get you to provide a coherent explanation of your position.

I delivered that @3.

It's about the Court granting the President an immunity without a  textual basis in the Constitution, the same logic it applied in the Trump case.

No court should ever give immunity or power to the PotUS that is not supported by the CotUS.   Constitutional amendments cannot —constitutionally— be created by the SCotUS.   Article II is to be interpreted by the SCotUS, but not changed.  Change requires an amendment.

Importantly, Fitzgerald did not contradict the CotUS.   Again see @3.   The 2024 ruling gave the PotUS immunity to violate the law and the CotUS and thus contradicts the spirit and letter of the CotUS.

 
 
 
Sean Treacy
Professor Principal
3.1.9  seeder  Sean Treacy  replied to  TᵢG @3.1.8    11 months ago
onstitutional amendments cannot —constitutionally— be created by the SCotUS.   

Good thing the court didn't

Change requires an amendment.

If you think the Trump decision which was completely in line with precedent,  counts as an amendment, you must have hated the Warren Court, let alone  god knows how many Court decisions since the New Deal Justices got rolling. 

I look forward to your passionate denunciation of Griswold vs. Connecticut. 

mportantly, Fitzgerald did not contradict the CotUS. 

That's simply incoherent. The decisions   are based on the same principles. Even your favorite source chatgpt admits that.   To declare one fine and the other the worst decision in decades and a threat to the Republic  is simply pure partisan cheerleading. 

 
 
 
TᵢG
Professor Principal
3.1.10  TᵢG  replied to  Sean Treacy @3.1.9    11 months ago
I look forward to your passionate denunciation of Griswold vs. Connecticut. 

Focus on what we are discussing.

That's simply incoherent.

Then you will find most analyses of this decision to be incoherent.   The problem thus is with you.

Even your favorite source chatgpt admits that.

You are cherry-picking.   Basic confirmation bias at play.

To declare one fine and the other the worst decision in decades and a threat to the Republic  is simply pure partisan cheerleading. 

And now you are inventing claims I have never made.


It is amazing.  Even with Trump illustrating the danger of giving a PotUS criminal immunity, you still attempt to defend this decision.

 
 

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