Indian Civil Rights Act
The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. 1301-1304.
Indian nations, whose sovereignty predates the United States and is acknowledged by the Constitution, were not invited to the Constitutional Convention, and never ratified the document. Thus, the Constitutions protections for individual liberties, embodied in the Bill of Rights and elsewhere, do not apply to tribal government.
During the Civil Rights era, members of Congress became concerned about American Indian civil rights in Indian country. The Senates Constitutional Rights Committee conducted hearings from 1961-1968. Testimony focused on abuses of Indian individuals committed by state and federal officials. However, other testimony complained of tribal government practices, including civil rights abuses. Consequently, pursuant to its broad legislative powers of Indian tribes (plenary power), Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 to address civil rights in Indian country.
Amendments to ICRA
Since its enactment in 1968, the ICRA has been amended four times. It was first amended in 1986 to increase the sentencing limitations in section 1302(7).
This provision originally limited tribes to imposing sentences for a single offense to no greater than six months imprisonment or a fine of $500 or both. In 1986, this provision was amended (as part of a federal drug and alcohol prevention act) to "in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of one year or a fine of $5,000 or both".
The ICRA was amended again in 1991 in order to overturn the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). The Duro decision held that tribal courts lack criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians. The United States Congress overturned the Duro decision (the so-called Congressional "Duro-fix") by added language the language "and means the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians" to the definition of "powers of self-government". This Congressional Duro-fix restored tribal court criminal jurisdiction over all Indians (members and non-members).
The ICRA was amended for the third time in 2010 by the Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA) of 2010. TLOA was passed with the goal to improve public safety and justice systems in Indian country in response to significant rates of violent crime. Most notably, TLOA amends ICRA by expanding the limitations on the term of imprisonment from one year to three years, and fines, from $5,000 to $15,000, that can be imposed on defendants convicted in tribal court.
However, in order to impose these "enhanced sentencing" options, tribal courts must provide certain additional, enumerated due process protections. These include the provision of effective defense counsel and a licensed and law-trained judge, making the tribal laws publicly available, and maintain a record of the criminal proceeding.
The ICRA was amended for the fourth time in 2013 in order to partially overturn the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). Oliphant held that tribal courts lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants. The United States Congress partially overturned the Oliphant decision in the re-authorization of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 2013.
Title IX of the VAWA Act, among other provisions, provided for "special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction" to tribal courts over non-Indian offenders who commit domestic violence, dating violence, or violate a protection order. However, in order to utilize this special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction, tribal courts will have to provide certain enumerated due process protections. These include all of the TLOA due process protections (even if tribes do not impose the enhanced sentencing options), as well as several additional due process protections including the right to an impartial jury.
Enforcement of ICRA
For ten years after its passage, the general perception was that ICRA gave the federal court broad powers to hear and decide claims of civil rights violations by tribal governments. This changed dramatically, however, in 1978 with the U. S. Supreme Court decision in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 439 U.S. 49 (1978).
During the ten-year period from the date of the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act in 1968 to the Martinez decision in 1978, federal courts heard approximately 80 cases involving the application of the Indian Civil Rights Act. These cases covered many subjects including tribal election disputes, reapportionment of voting districts on Indian reservations ("one man, one vote"), tribal government employee rights; land use regulations and condemnation procedures; criminal and civil proceedings in tribal courts; tribal membership and voting; tribal police activities, conduct of tribal council members and council meetings, and standards for enforcing due process of law and equal protection of the laws in tribal settings.
During this ten-year period, the federal courts devised rules of interpretation, including:
While the ICRA is generally patterned after the Bill of Rights, the same language does not necessarily have to be interpreted in the same way;
The ICRA does not require that Indians and non-Indians always have to be treated identically by tribal governments, that is, different treatment is permitted and justified in certain circumstances (for example, tribal membership requirements);
Tribal customs, traditions, and culture must be considered in interpreting and applying the ICRA; and
Tribal remedies must first be exhausted before a dispute can be heard in federal court.
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 439 U.S. 49 (1978).
Santa Clara Pueblo is located in northern New Mexico and has about 1200 members living on it along with about 150-200 non-members. In 1939 the tribal council of the Pueblo adopted an ordinance that extended tribal membership to the children of male members who married non-members but denied membership to children of female members who married non-members. The tribe justified the ordinance on the basis of its patriarchal traditions plus the economic need to restrict tribal enrollment.
Julia Martinez, a full-blooded member of the Pueblo, married a Navajo. Even though their children were raised in the Pueblo, spoke the Tewa language, and continued to live there, because of the 1939 ordinance they were denied membership in the tribe. After unsuccessfully attempting to get the Pueblo to change the ordinance, Mrs. Martinez sued the tribe and its governor in federal court. She claimed that the ordinance denied her and her children equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the ICRA.
The issue was whether or not the ICRA prohibits an Indian tribe from setting membership criteria that discriminate against women. It is a difficult question: equal rights for women on one side; a tribes rights to set membership criteria on the other side.
The Supreme Court in Martinez never actually decided the merits of the case. It disposed of the case on a jurisdictional basis; that is, that the ICRA does not give federal courts broad jurisdiction to review tribal government actions in Indian country.
Thus, Ms. Martinezs challenge to the tribal ordinance could not go forward. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that there were two purposes that Congress had in mind in enacting the ICRA:
Protection of individual civil rights in Indian country. It did this by prohibiting tribal governments from taking actions that might interfere with individual freedoms.
Encouragement of tribal self-government. It did this by implicitly recognizing the importance of tribal governments on reservations, reaffirming the idea of sovereign immunity as applied to Indian tribes, and giving tribal institutions the principal responsibility for resolving disputes over civil rights.
Notice that the only section of the ICRA that actually mentions a "court of the United States," is 1303, which gives people held in custody by an Indian tribe a right to go to federal court to challenge that detention. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 439 U.S. 49 (1978) the Supreme Court interpreted ICRA as not giving the Federal Court any power to review any complaints of ICRA violations by a tribal government except those arising as writ of habeas corpus actionscomplaints of unlawful detention raised by individuals being held in tribal custody. The decision held that violations of all the other rights guaranteed under the ICRA, including equal protection rights, fell under tribal jurisdiction, and thus could only be brought in tribal court.

Who decided this?
Since the indians have since been granted citizenship, doesn't that negate this decision?
No ma'am - if we are a tribal member living on a reservation, only tribal laws pertain. If we are off the reservation, then we are applicable to allfed/state laws.
I thinkJulia Martinez and her children were treated shabbily by the Tribe. It goes back to the question many Indians have asked of the federal government:
Julia was treated exactly as the tribal culture and traditions dictated - which is a good thing for the tribe in that it shows they are consistent in their laws.
The Pueblo did conduct a vote later to see if that custom should be overturned - but, the Pueblo people said no.
That was one of the primary arguments of SCOTUS. For the tribe to maintain their sovereignty, they can't step in and overturn a tribes/nations decision making.
Makes me wonder how it would work when an individual is wanted by both a Tribe and the Feds? Do they extradite?
Depends on the crime. If it were one of the Major Crimes Act issues, the Feds automatically have jurisdiction. If it were theft, on the rez, the tribe has jurisdiction. If off, the state/Feds.
In a Major Crimes Act issue, is there any recourse if the tribe feels the accused is innocent of the crime or if the crime was enacted within the scope of tribal tradition but outside the scope of accepted federal law?
Well, if it's outside the scope of Fed law, it wouldn't be a Major Crime, so, if it happened on the rez, the tribe/nation would have jurisdiction.
The Feds would have the case if it were a Major Crimes. If the tribe/nation believed the person was innocent, it would be up to them to be his defender. Normally, the Feds will furnish an attorney if the person can't afford one (4th Amendment - I think), but the tribe/nation could also furnish one in support and they would replace the Fed appointed public attorney.
That is an interesting and dynamic possible dilemma is it not? I mean, I don't know, but it seems to be.
Technically, if you're on the rez and Indian, the tribe/nation has jurisdiction - except in Major Crimes cases.
Off the rez??? The state and Feds battle it out depending on the crime.
Well, (LOL) speaking from personal experience, what if you're a white dude on the Rez and....
Also, is there any means by which the tribal Elders can offer sanctuary on the reservation to anyone? Has it ever been tried?
If a church can offer it, why can't the tribal Elders on a reservation, since the tribes are sovereign nations?
Depends - with the passage of the Tribal Law and Order Act and VAWA, the tribes/nations now have authority, with local support, to capture/hold white dudes until the locals/Feds can show up. Previously they couldn't.
Yes - as sovereign nations, tribes "can" offer sanctuary - but they won't.
1st, I'm not trying to be a putz, nor argumentative. I just don't understand. It seems like a good thing, but is it a bad thing?
I makes sense to me that on the reservation, the tribal justice and council makes the decisions, but off the reservations, someone should have the same rights and protections as any citizen of the country. Is that how it works?
Note: I'm not an attorney, nor a student of Tribal Law. Please be gentle with me, because I just don't understand the issues at stake. Thanks!
Why would they not offer sanctuary to one of their own if they felt he/she was being unfairly hounded by the feds?
I'm sort of thinking of the Baby Veronica case. Could the tribe have offered sanctuary to the child and father in spite of the order from the governor and the federal authorities to relinquish her to the foster parents?
Gosh no Dowser - good questions.
Indian reservations are sovereign "countries/states" and the Constitution was not written with them in mind. The Constitution was ratified in 1789 and, at that time, there were no "Federal" reservations. In fact, up to that time, the U. S. had only entered into 7 treaties with the tribes/nations.
Since the tribes/nations were not included in the Constitution, the Bill of Rights did/do not apply to them. When the rez system came about in the early 1800's, they became separate states/countries that no one had any authority over 'cept the tribes/nations and theFeds - in accordance with the treaties. Well, that really didn't seem to be such a big issue since there weren't that many Indians to worry 'bout 'til the 50's when a lot of tribal/nation members began complaining to the Feds that they didn't have freedom of speech, property wasn't protected, couldn't vote, could be punished twice for the same crime, etc. - all the things in the Constitutional Bill of Rights that people outside the reservations were afforded. Senator Irwin recognized that and - well, the story is above in the thread.
On the rez, the tribe/nation is in control. Off the rez, the state/local/Feds are in control. ICRA has been amended four times to give tribal/nation members the same constitutionally guaranteed rights that all non-Indians have - and, if Congress does as they should, it will probably be amended a few more times to offer more protections.
BUT - Congress is being very careful not to tread on the sovereignty thing and all of the amendments that have been made have been done so as to NOT take any authority of the tribal/nation governments from being able to "manage/govern" their governments. To do so would be a huge violation of the Constitution.
Helpful??
Ok, now I understand. Thought you were talking 'bout all of Reid's relatives crossing the borders.
No, they couldn't offer sanctuary 'cause that's a violation of Fed law (aiding, abetting and harboring) and, if a tribe/nation did that, Congress just might get pissed enough to yank their recognition and they'd lose their rez.
Tribes/nations may be sovereign, but Congress, per SCOTUS, has their thumb on them and can do them in if they so desire.
Nice try - Indian Law was developed and dictated by SCOTUS and Congress to further control and, supposedly, to protect the tribes - it was not within the tribes entirely. In fact, the tribes/nations have had absolutely no control over the issuance/formulation of Indian Law even though SCOTUS has told Congress that they "have" to consult with the tribes when developing/initiating any laws impacting the tribes/nations.
True - a person who feels slighted, "may", after going through all tribal/nation routes available, attempt to appeal to the Feds. In most cases, if it is involving Fed jurisdiction, then, obviously, the Feds will look at it. Some cases, such as the Martinez case, they would remand it to the tribes due to the sovereignty concerns. The Poodry v. the Tonawanda of Seneca Indians case was about tribal members banished from the tribe AND the reservation. As such, the Feds stepped in because banishment from the rez constituted a "take" under the 5th Amendment, which is illegal.
1stwarrior,
If a non-Indian person has an inability to work and support themselves they may be eligible to obtain benefits from governmental sources.
Are Indians able to do this as well or is the tribe responsible for the welfare of a registered Native American, even if the tribe is extremely poor and barely has the resources to limp along, such as Pine Ridge?
I ain't doin' it.
If they live on a rez, it's the tribe/nation's responsibility 'cause they are not part of the Fed "welfare" system hence are not putting any funds into the big kitty. Off the rez is another story - they are part of the system 'cause they've received earnings, been taxed, etc..