Paradoxes of international religious freedom
It has been almost twenty years since the US Congress passed the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), which was signed into law in 1998 by then President Bill Clinton. The IRFA inscribed into law and US foreign policy a set of definitions and monitoring protocols, and it mandated the creation of a bureaucracy within the US State Department—the Office of Religious Freedom , which is charged with promoting religious freedom as a core objective of US foreign policy. Under the language and mandate of the IRFA, this office produces yearly reports on religious freedom around the globe, and its work becomes the basis by which the Secretary of State categorizes some countries as “countries of particular concern” for their “particularly severe violations of religious freedom.” Such a designation can trigger various disciplinary and punitive responses by the US government, including economic sanctions. As Elizabeth Shakman Hurd shows through incisive analysis in her recently published Beyond Religious Freedom: The New Global Politics of Religion , the impact of IRFA and other efforts to mobilize a religious freedom framework in international relations is far-reaching, not only in practical terms, but also at the level of defining “religion” itself.
Problems of language and definition haunted the debate surrounding the IRFA as it traveled through the legislative process of the US Congress. I have written more extensively about the testimony that led up to the passage of the IRFA elsewhere , but here I want to highlight the linguistic and rhetorical contortionism that characterized the contributions of several of the participants in the discussion and that is, I argue, symptomatic of a broader definitional and theoretical problematic. On May 1, 1997, in opening remarks for hearings of the US Senate’s Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, then Senator Sam Brownback made two interweaving claims: first, that concern for religious freedom is a peculiarly American concern, one rooted in national history, collective identity, and shared convictions; and second, that the underlying conflict the legislation sought to resolve was not between competing religious commitments but between religion and “individuals and governments who do not value freedom of worship at all.” Throughout the rest of the record of this hearing, speakers routinely used different terms to talk about religion—sometimes “worship,” sometimes “theology,” but most often “faith” and “belief.” Jews and Muslims, for example, appear throughout the testimony as “members of the Jewish faith” and “members of the Islamic faith,” a locution that situates faith and belief at the core of the implicit definition of religion and turns Jews and Muslims into analogues for Protestant Christians and therefore recognizable religious subjects worthy of religious freedom.
The role of language is a critical pressure point in the politics of international religious freedom, and one sees it not only in this congressional hearing but in other critical contexts where the language of human rights—and particularly the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)—enters into the debate. Article 18 of the UDHR holds that: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance.” The UDHR is an aspirational document with normative grounding in secular values. It imagines a world constituted around human equality and solidarity. It also configures religion primarily in terms of thought, conscience, and belief. According to Article 18, thought, conscience, and belief constitute the essential core of religion, a core that may (or may not) be expressed or made “manifest” through “teaching, practice, worship, and observance.”
My thought immediately turned to Indian's religiosity and other forms of animism. These are folk who may never mention the word religion but live life in a fashion they consider to be sacred. It is as spiritual or religious as any other is it not?!
I doubt it Larry, remember that our ''religion'' was outlawed for decades.
Your correct in that it is a ''certain type of religious authority'' in mind. I wonder what it could be./s
Strange how things turn out. I can see a day in the near future when Indians and other indigenous peoples are begged for their help to try an heal the planet and help the meek survive on it. Indian's religion reflects a great understanding and respect for the earth and it's ways. One day we will have no choice but to return to it in complete humility and gratefulness. Maybe that sounds a little fruity; I don't care, the older I get the more sure I am about this matter.
A frog does not drink up the pond in which it lives. — Anishinaabe
Love this enchanting analogy !
" The IRFA inscribed into law and US foreign policy a set of definitions and monitoring protocols, and it mandated the creation of a bureaucracy within the US State Department—the Office of Religious Freedom , which is charged with promoting religious freedom as a core objective of US foreign policy."
I wonder if their staff includes any atheists.
Good question to which I have no answer. They seem to have a certain type of religious authority in mind...
Meanwhile, the USCIRF made an unexpected appearance in the current presidential political contest, inadvertently highlighting the paradoxical nature of advocacy for religious freedom. On March 17, 2016, USCIRF Chair Robert P. George endorsed Senator Ted Cruz for the Republican nomination for the presidency, declaring Cruz a staunch defender of religious freedom. In his endorsement, George spoke loftily of Cruz’s commitment to the US Constitution but, not surprisingly, did not mention Cruz’s association with Christian dominionism, a theocratic movement documented and discussed by both activist-journalists and scholars . This endorsement comports with George’s consistent positions as an advocate for religious freedom; in 2009, for example, he served as one of three drafters of the Manhattan Declaration , a call to civil disobedience by Christians in the US on issues of abortion same-sex marriage under the umbrella of religious freedom. George’s endorsement of Cruz, which he grounds explicitly in the context of religious freedom and in his own authority as the chair of the USCIRF, may be an atypical moment in the international religious freedom project, but it is symptomatic of the paradoxes in which this project is embedded,
Larry,
On a side note, have you read Hurd's book? Interesting topic I think I'd like to explore.
Actually Lynn, you are on the main theme. No I haven't read the book. I was researching different books looking for new reads, and it is on a long list, though closer to my heart. So, I may very well read this one soon and if I do, for sure I will write up a review.
Thanks Larry. Putting it on my Kindle read list, we may compare notes at a latter date
"Under the language and mandate of the IRFA, this office produces yearly reports on religious freedom around the globe, and its work becomes the basis by which the Secretary of State categorizes some countries as “countries of particular concern” for their “particularly severe violations of religious freedom.” Such a designation can trigger various disciplinary and punitive responses by the US government, including economic sanctions."
What "disciplinary and punitive responses, including economic sanctions" imposed by the State Department have we seen with respect to all Muslim theocracies, China and Russia? Has Iran suffered at the hands of the State Department? How about Indonesia, or China?
The thing about religious freedom is : if you give too much of it to any one religion it could easily destroy the other religions ...
Proselytizing, forced conversions and murdering apostates are a problem if there is real freedom.
They don't call it "murdering apostates" . They call it supporting the faith and punishing the infidels ...
They can call it "Gilding the Lily" if they want, but it's still murdering persons who leave that particular faith.