Faith And Reason
Encyclopedia Britannica - Faith And Reason
(bolded by JR)
Different conceptions of faith cohere with different views of its relation to reason or rationality. The classic medieval understanding of faith, set forth by Thomas Aquinas , saw it as the belief in revealed truths on the authority of God as their ultimate source and guarantor. Thus, though the ultimate object of faith is God, its immediate object is the body of propositions articulating the basic Christian dogmas . Such faith is to be distinguished from knowledge. Whereas the propositions that are the objects of scientia, or knowledge, compel belief by their self-evidence or their demonstrability from self-evident premises , the propositions accepted by faith do not thus compel assent but require a voluntary act of trusting acceptance. As unforced belief, faith is “an act of the intellect assenting to the truth at the command of the will” ( Summa theologiae , II/II, Q. 4, art. 5); and it is because this is a free and responsible act that faith is one of the virtues.
It follows that one cannot have knowledge and faith at the same time in relation to the same proposition; faith can only arise in the absence of knowledge. Faith also differs from mere opinion, which is inherently changeable. Opinions are not matters of absolute commitment but allow in principle for the possibility of doubt and change. Faith, as the wholehearted acceptance of revealed truth, excludes doubt.
In the wider context of his philosophy , Aquinas held that human reason, without supernatural aid, can establish the existence of God and the immortality of the soul; for those who cannot or do not engage in such strenuous intellectual activity, however, these matters are also revealed and can be known by faith. Faith, though, extends beyond the findings of reason in accepting further truths such as the triune nature of God and the divinity of Christ . Aquinas thus supported the general (though not universal) Christian view that revelation supplements, rather than cancels or replaces, the findings of sound philosophy.
From a skeptical point of view, which does not acknowledge divine revelation, this Thomist conception amounts to faith—belief that is without evidence or that is stronger than the evidence warrants, the gap being filled by the believer’s own will to believe. As such it attracts the charge that belief upon insufficient evidence is always irrational.
In response to this kind of attack the French philosopher Blaise Pascal (1623–62) proposed a voluntarist defense of faith as a rational wager. Pascal assumed, in disagreement with Thomas Aquinas but in agreement with much modern thinking, that divine existence can neither be proved nor disproved. He reasoned, therefore, that if one decides to believe in God and to act on this basis, one gains eternal life if right but loses little if wrong, whereas if one decides not to believe, one gains little if right but may lose eternal life if wrong, concluding that the rational course is to believe. The argument has been criticized theologically for presupposing an unacceptable image of God as rewarding such calculating worship and also on the philosophical ground that it is too permissive in that it could justify belief in the claims, however fantastic, of any person or group who threatened nonbelievers with damnation or other dangerous consequences.
The American philosopher William James (1842–1910) refined this approach by limiting it, among matters that cannot be proved, to belief-options that one has some real inclination or desire to accept, carry momentous implications , and are such that a failure to choose constitutes a negative choice. Theistic belief is for many people such an option, and James claimed that they have the right to make the positive decision to believe and to proceed in their lives on that basis. Either choice involves unavoidable risks : on the one hand the risk of being importantly deluded and on the other the risk of missing a limitlessly valuable truth. In this situation each individual is entitled to decide which risk to run . This argument has also been criticized as being too permissive and as constituting in effect a license for wishful believing, but its basic principle can perhaps be validly used in the context of basing beliefs upon one’s religious experience.
The element of risk in faith as a free cognitive choice was emphasized, to the exclusion of all else, by Kierkegaard in his idea of the leap of faith. He believed that without risk there is no faith, and that the greater the risk the greater the faith.
Faith is thus a passionate commitment, not based upon reason but inwardly necessitated, to that which can be grasped in no other way.
The epistemological character of faith as assent to propositions, basic to the Thomist account, is less pronounced in the conceptions of Pascal and James in that these accept not a system of doctrines but only the thought of God as existing, which itself has conceptual and implicitly propositional content. Kierkegaard’s self-constituting leap of faith likewise only implicitly involves conceptual and propositional thought, as does the account of faith based upon Ludwig Wittgenstein ’s concept of seeing-as ( Philosophical Investigations , 1953). Wittgenstein pointed to the epistemological significance of puzzle pictures, such as the ambiguous “duck-rabbit” that can be seen either as a duck’s head facing one way or a rabbit’s head facing another way. The enlarged concept of experiencing-as (developed by the British philosopher John Hick ) refers to the way in which an object, event, or situation is experienced as having a particular character or meaning such that to experience it in this manner involves being in a dispositional state to behave in relation to the object or event, or within the situation, in ways that are appropriate to its having that particular character. All conscious experience is in this sense experiencing-as. The application of this idea to religion suggests that the total environment is religiously ambiguous, capable of being experienced in both religious and naturalistic ways. Religious faith is the element of uncompelled interpretation within the distinctively religious ways of experiencing—for theism , experiencing the world or events in history or in one’s own life as mediating the presence and activity of God. In ancient Hebrew history, for example, events that are described by secular historians as the effects of political and economic forces were experienced by the prophets as occasions in which God was saving or punishing, rewarding or testing, the Israelites. In such cases, religious experiencing-as does not replace secular experiencing-as but supervenes upon it, revealing a further order of meaning in the events of the world. And the often unconscious cognitive choice whereby someone experiences religiously constitutes, on this view, faith in its most epistemologically basic sense.
For these voluntarist, existentialist, and experiential conceptions of faith the place of reason in religion, although important, is secondary.
Reason cannot directly establish the truth of religious propositions, but it can defend the propriety of trusting one’s deeper intuitions or one’s religious experience and basing one’s beliefs and life upon them.
These schools of thought assume that the philosophical arguments for and against the existence of God are inconclusive, and that the universe is capable of being consistently thought of and experienced in both religious and naturalistic ways.
This assumption, however, runs counter to the long tradition of natural theology .
If you had faith in your suppositions, you wouldn't feel the need to express them in large fonts.
Off topic. Next time will be removed.
I could support this:
"Reason cannot directly establish the truth of religious propositions, but it can challenge the propriety of trusting one’s deeper intuitions or one’s religious experience and basing one’s beliefs and life upon them."
By changing the one word ( "defend" into "challenge") you turn the sentence into the exact opposite of it's meaning in the article. Is that what you call acceptance?
No, I explained this in my post. I wrote that this is what I could support.
Also, challenge is objective - the challenge might be addressed in favor of faith. The word ‘defend’ presupposes one outcome, challenge connotes reasoning through debate.
Dear Friend John Russell: This is a well researched, carefully articulated article.
Thank you for sharing it with us.
We are grateful.
Peace and Abundant Blessings Always.
Enoch.
Enoch, you are a theologian. How would you respond to the atheists contention that faith in God is not "logical" ?
Dear Friend John Russell: You pose a legitimate and interesting question.
I try to avoid specific engagement in such discussions for a few reasons.
In both real life and cyber space people of every category, those who agree, disagree and detest what you and I are doing still have Pastoral care needs.
We all do.
That is just human beings being human.
When the chips are down, they need someone to whom they can turn who will be there for them non-judgmentally.
Someone who will accept and address their needs, respect their values, life style choices, first premise sets, (even if totally at odds with our own).
The life of service entails being open to, acceptable and accessible to any and everyone who need and want pastoral care.
SW, SW, SW, N.
Some will come to us.
Some will not come to us.
So what, next!
We are not always able to know in advance who will look to us when they need someone.
We try not to do things which, however much justified would hinder them from coming to us when and as needed and wanted.
Since that doesn't touch your salient and vital inquiry, let me point toward the following works by the late Harvard Professor Alfred North Whitehead.
In such books as Process and Reality, Religion in the Making, and Science and Philosophy he consistently makes this point.
The most important thing to observe about any systems or methodology's of thought and/or approach are their first premises.
This is so to avoid the circular argument of self justification.
To establish the validity of a method or system by assuming what it is trying to prove is a dog chasing its tail.
Lots of ground covered.
No progress made.
How then does one choose to adopt, or construct an adequate epistemological model from which to proceed when pursuing truth?
In the article William James is mentioned.
In his excellent Varieties of Religious Experience he suggests good old American Pragmatism.
Reductionist epistemological models like those used by the hard and soft sciences seem to bear great fruit regarding the properties and interactions of reality at their most basic physical levels.
This is no small feat.
Credit earned is credit due.
The sciences engage working hypothesis.
They are used until something better comes along.
Think temporal, not eternal.
Think physical, not metaphysical.
They are impotent when it comes to value theory.
What is the number of electrons in the valence shell of a righteous atom?
What is the formula in physics of an act of compassion?
What is the genus and species of a word of comfort to those who are hurting by the normal and often unfair things thrown at us by life?
What microscope or telescope do we view to decide what course of action to take when, for example medical doctors agree on all the facts of a case, but cannot reach consensus on which option from which to choose for treatment versus research?
Be of good cheer.
The humanities, religion, philosophy, theosophy all address such matters in the language and using the tools of metaphysics.
Our epistemological models are adequate.
We do not co-mingle or conflate the physical with the metaphysical.
Not in language.
Not in tools.
Not in methods or systems.
We use what works best in any given context.
See Ahad Ha Am's (Asher Ginsberg's) distinction between historical and archeological truth {Ha Nekudah ha Nikud}.
Read also Gilbert Ryle's Dogma of the Ghost in the Machine. The concept of a category mistake is on-point here.
To try to limit metaphysics because there are differing assumptions, rules and procedures between the physical and metaphysical are examples of disingenuous straw men moves.
They are also hopelessly counter productive.
All sports do not have the same rules, equipment, playing surfaces, goals, locations and seasons.
Little is to be gained by insisting basketball plays wear skates, football players swing at pigskins with bats, or cross country runners put shots.
Big planet.
Bigger universe.
Plenty of room to use each in context where best they work.
Consistency belongs within each category.
No one size fits all.
Reality is neither static or uni-dimensional.
I hope these references to what others have thought is of value on this great topic.
You are an even handed and open cogitator of matters universal in scope.
Good on you, dear friend, brother in spirit, and treasured writing partner.
Good on you.
Peace and Abundant Blessings Always.
Enoch.
Excellent !
My feeling is that if it were possible to disprove every basis for belief in God then all the effort the atheists put in might be more commendable. But I don't believe it is possible.
I do think some of the arguments atheists make, in terms of how Biblical text or Islamic text or Hindu text is fantastical and unlikely to have occurred in a literal sense, are persuasive. But I don't necessarily take scriptural texts literally and don't see any contradiction between that and belief in God.
As you say, there are many ways of looking at and coming to an understanding of these things.
If faith yields truth then all faithful would be in agreement. Truth cannot contradict truth.
Not the case. Not even remotely close. What does that say about faith yielding truth?
i agree - problem is that "faith" leads everyone to a different "truth" which is quite evident talking to different people of the exact same religion, they all have different beliefs and some dismiss the bible (partially or whole) while others don't --- yet they all think they are the one's with the truth. And, after knowing all of this - they still believe it even when the illogical is pointed out to them (as illustrated in previous sentence). If there is only "one" truth (one God etc, one answer) then even through faith - everyone would have the same answer and same beliefs since they are all worshiping the exact same God and their religion would be more uniform instead of fragmented with a million people believing a million different "truths". 2+2=4, that's a truth, 2+2 won't equal 5 no matter how much you believe it to be true.
If God were completely revealed ("one truth") there would be no need for faith. If God exists, it has kept a great deal of it's purposes unknown to man. You might say that is an indication there is no God, where I might say it indicates that we do not understand God, and perhaps are not meant to fully.
it's like the "glass is half full" or the "glass is half empty" situation, huh ? Regardless if God exists or not - your "faith" in your God should lead you to the "one truth" yet it leads you to your "one truth" while it leads another to their "one truth" and then another to their "one truth" and another to their "one truth" and yet you all think you have the "one truth" which you posit as "fact" to everyone else. do you read 2+2 and have faith that it's -7.3398 ?
True. If one has actual evidence one need not construct a harness (faith) to host speculative claims as if they were truth.
I would say that the lack of evidence of the grandest possible entity suggests there is no reason to believe in such an entity. Wiser to follow the evidence to where it leads rather than leap to a specific conclusion (e.g. the biblical God) based on absolutely nothing but man's imagination.
Note: 'no reason to believe' does not argue there is no god. It simply notes the obvious - there is no evidence that would lead critical analysis to conclude 'God'.
God is by definition a supernatural entity. That means it exists wholly or partly outside of our ability to prove much about it. Hence "faith" or "belief" ( I think 'faith' pertains more accurately to acceptance of dogma, where 'belief' would pertain more to acceptance of the existence of God writ more large). You can say it is silly to believe in a supernatural being, or that it is not 'logical', but you can't prove that such belief is wrong. You can't prove it because you can't prove or disprove the existence of the supernatural, which is by definition beyond what we can comprehend through natural means.
I have a subscription to the Great Courses (they are having a sale and I took the plunge) which is an online teaching company that has 'courses' of lectures on a myriad of subjects by university professors. Anyway, I was looking at the course on "The Big Questions" of philosophy, and there is one lecture where the professor takes up the subject "Why Is There Something Instead Of Nothing"? , and he goes into the topics of the singularity, the big bang, and 'quantam foam'. He says it is not true that it is impossible to get something from nothing because matter can be formed from the "nothing" of "quantam foam". How something called "quantam foam" qualifies as nothing is a mystery he doesnt explain. But he goes on to say that quantam foam is eternal. It doesn't have a cause, it just is.
Now I ask you, is it any more irrational to believe in God who created this universe than it is to believe that there is an eternal 'quantam foam,' that had no beginning, but just is? The professor calls this a "brute reality", but isnt it really just another item of faith?
You did not read this in my post?:
I routinely add comments like this -making them extremely obvious- purposely to stop the cliche 'you cannot prove there is no god' straw man argument. Yet, you go there anyway. I never argue that one can prove there is no god. I routinely note that proving or disproving 'god' has never been done and likely never will be done.
Given the number of times I have offered that (in my opinion) it is not irrational to believe there might be a god defined as ' sentient creator of the known universe ' (but no more than that) this question should be directed to someone else. I have answered it already (over and over - preemptively even).
However, on the quantum foam part, you use the word ' believe '. Science is not about ' believing ' but rather being convinced (to some degree) - accepting something as most likely true based on evidence and reason. If someone 'believes in evolution' or 'believes in quantum entanglement' or 'believes in dark energy' then one is very confused about science.
Finally, everything in the plank epoch (first 10 -44 seconds of the universe) is unknown. Thus the honest answer for how the universe started is ' we do not know '. That is the answer science (collectively) offers as of 2018. Stay tuned.
What is the proof that quantum foam is eternal? The professor on the video said it as a fact, not an opinion.
Ask the professor. I did not make the claim. Why are you asking me? And why are you still asking for proof?
This quote is interesting in that it presents the religious master stroke regarding faith. First it distinguishes faith from knowledge (I agree). Then it presents the grand claim: faith is some special revealed truth. Faith is not speculation, hope or opinion but some very special divine communication.
Get people to believe that mere claim and you can get them to believe anything. Just present that which is to believed under the guise of 'faith' and all is well. Master stroke because this works superbly well on the homo sapien brain - even in modern times.
I have faith that there is no god, just like some have faith that there is a god. Both forms of faith carry the exact same weight by definition. The reality that one of those forms is perceived to carry more weight by its adherents is simply a function of the number of adherents on both sides. More adherents results in more unearned credibility.