FPI Analysis: What U.S. Officials Required, What the Iran Deal Concedes
Throughout the nuclear negotiations with Iran, the Obama administration insisted on high standards for a final deal. In speeches, congressional testimony, interviews, and other public statements, U.S. officials articulated specific requirements that would, if implemented, prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
This FPI Analysis, which complements an earlier FPI publication released on June 29, assesses whether the July 14 nuclear agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) , meets the administrations own stated requirements.
I. REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEAL
Dismantling Irans Nuclear Infrastructure
What U.S. Officials Required
December 4, 2013: Chief U.S. negotiator Wendy Sherman tells PBS that a final agreement should include a lot of dismantling of their infrastructure (emphasis added).
December 10, 2013: I dont think that any of us thought we were just imposing these sanctions for the sake of imposing them, says Secretary of State John Kerry in congressional testimony. We did it because we knew that it would hopefully help Iran dismantle its nuclear program . That was the whole point of the [sanctions] regime (emphasis added).
What the Deal Concedes
- Iran will neither dismantle any of its centrifuges nor close any of its nuclear facilities. Limits on the expansion of the Iranian nuclear program expire within 10 to 15 years.
- Iran will continue to operate 5,060 centrifuges for the purpose of enriching uranium. It will place its remaining 13,500 centrifuges in storage. After 10 years, Iran may resume operation of the centrifuges in storage.
- Research and development on a range of advanced centrifuges may continue for the agreements duration. In eight-and-a-half years, Tehran may begin testing up to 30 of its two most advanced centrifuges. At the end of the eighth year, Iran may begin manufacturing up to 200 of them per year per type.
- Irans uranium stockpile cannot officially exceed 300 kg under the deal. However, enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies from Russia or other sources for use in Irans nuclear reactors will not be counted against this limit (Paragraph 7). The other sources goes unspecified.
- World powers and Iran will cooperate to strengthen and fortify Tehrans nuclear program, including its ability to prevent, protect and respond to nuclear security threats to nuclear facilities and systems (Annex III, Paragraph 10).
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Irans Right to Enrich Uranium
What U.S. Officials Required
November 24, 2013: There is no right to enrich, Secretary of State John Kerry tells ABC News. We do not recognize a right to enrich. It is clear, in the in the NPT, in the nonproliferation treaty, its very, very [clear] that there is no right to enrich.
What the Deal Concedes
- Tehran receives immediate permission to enrich uranium, which it had previously done in violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions. Restrictions on enrichment expire after 10 to 15 years.
- The JCPOA asserts that none of its provisions should be considered precedents under international law or the NPT. In practice, Iran receives the right to enrich.
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The Arak Heavy Water Reactor
What U.S. Officials Required
December 10, 2013: From our point of view, Arak is unacceptable, says Secretary of State John Kerry in House testimony. You cant have a heavy water reactor.
April 2, 2015: The U.S. version of the framework agreement with Iran states that Tehran has committed indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or reprocessing research and development on spent nuclear fuel (emphasis added).
What the Deal Concedes
- The JCPOA directs Iran to redesign the heavy water reactor at Arak such that it cannot produce weapon-grade plutonium in normal operation (Annex I, Paragraph 2). After 15 years, however, Tehran may acquire new heavy water reactors to produce weapons-grade plutonium.
- After 15 years, Iran may reprocess spent fuel, engage in research and development related to reprocessing, produce plutonium and uranium metals, and build or acquire facilities to separate plutonium or uranium from spent fuel.
- In the JCPOA, Iran states that it does not intend to conduct any reprocessing activities even after the binding restriction expires. At that point, however, the agreement itself technically does not prohibit them
- See more at: http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/fpi-analysis-what-us-officials-required-what-iran-deal-concedes#sthash.LBTMRpMk.dpuf

This analysis, of which only the first page is shown above, is the most comprehensive record of the administration's stated positions and goals for an agreement. It's sickening reading, frankly.
As you can see, the agreement falls short of every single goal and makes the President look like an international laughing stock. America was not just routed in the negotiations, it was humiliated.
the deal prevents Iran from getting nuclear weapons for at least 10 years
Of course it doesn't. As you stated just a few days ago, any industrialised country can build a bomb from scratch in 4-7 years. There's no prevention in this deal, whatsoever. Moreover, Iran always cheats on its obligations, always. Why in the world would you think they would bother to honor this particular agreement.
Iran gets everything it wants up front, sanctions relief and billions of dollars in unfrozen assets. Once they are gone, they will never, ever come back. Russia and China will make sure of that.
he international sanctions existed to get Iran to the bargaining table,
"I dont think that any of us thought we were just imposing these sanctions for the sake of imposing them, says Secretary of State John Kerry in congressional testimony. We did it because we knew that it would hopefully help Iran dismantle its nuclear program. That was the whole point of the [sanctions] regime.
Even John Kerry contradicts you.
r sonally talked to the ambassadors to the U.S. of the P5+1 nations
IF Russia and China like it, it must be good for America, right? They'd never act against our best interest. Forgive me for not believing that we should turn our foriegn policy over to two totalitarian regimes that hate us.
To quote Red State:
"These people cant be bothered to consult their constituents but they have time to be schmoozed by representatives of two totalitarian powers who are united in damaging American interests.
This article in Foreign Policy is notable for several things.
First, it is emblematic of the way the Obama administration has co-opted the American foreign policy establishment (by that I mean people who live in America and profess an interest in foreign policy rather than people who are pushing a foreign policy that keeps America safe) into supporting a truly ill-conceived and disastrous agreement with Iran simply because it is an agreement.
S econd, it demonstrates the complete collapse of any modicum of nationalism on the part of the Democrat party. That party has ceased to be American in any sense but that they have American passports and the head of that party is actively campaigning against the interests of this nation and the safety of its citizens. "
Advanced centrifuges for peace ... hooray !