What Would Israel and Hamas Consider a 'Win' in Gaza ?

S E E D E D   C O N T E N T

For Israel, nothing less than eradicating the terror organization here and now will be seen as a win. Hamas wants to sustain a permanent state of conflict, so just living to fight another day will be seen as a victory by its leaders.

The most frequently used word in Hebrew these days is “win,” in all forms and variations: We will win. Win the war. Together we will win. We must win. With God’s help we shall win. Winning is the only option – and so forth.

That is a natural visceral and cerebral sentiment following the devastation and carnage of October 7. But what exactly constitutes a win? Does declaring “we won” mean we actually won? Does the term “win” apply differently to Israel and Hamas?
By conventional definition and through applying the relevant metrics that measure power, there is no strategic proportionality whatsoever between Israel and Hamas. Israel is exponentially superior and stronger in every aspect and dimension. But strategy is a very broad and multifaceted construct in which, sometimes, the far more powerful can paradoxically find itself at a disadvantage.

This asymmetry uniquely exists when a state is at war with a non-state entity, and it relates particularly to the concepts of time and objective. In terms of what would constitute a win, a case could be made that the imbalance between Israel and Hamas does not necessarily favor Israel strategically. For Israel, a win invariably means comprehensively destroying Hamas militarily – or at least inflicting degrading, irretrievable military damage.

A win would also entail politically debilitating Hamas and rendering the terror organization incapable of exerting power and governing in Gaza. Anything less than that would amount to a limited tactical achievement, not a strategic game-changer.
For Hamas, a win means staying on its feet. The grand objective is to fuel and sustain a permanent state of conflict, constantly disrupt the status quo, and fight and murder to live another day. Hamas is a vicious terror organization, a tyrannical political movement and an extremist, theocratic-nationalist ideology, so therefore a win means retaining residual military capabilities, sufficient political power and maintaining a level of legitimacy among the Palestinians.

This is where the concept of time and perspectives of time frames are relevant.

Israel needs to win now. This is the outcome of the magnitude, barbarity and level of devastation caused by the October 7 attack, as well as for the more vague concepts of restoring deterrence and dissuading Hezbollah from escalating the conflict.
Hamas is not thinking about the here and now but in terms of decades. It seeks to undermine and delegitimize Israel, so a military defeat – as resounding and decisive as it might be – does not detract from that goal. While Hamas cannot tolerate the Mideast status quo that existed, especially with the prospect of Israeli-Saudi relations, Israel turned the status quo into a comfort zone of denial.

In other words, Israel needs the win to be strategic in scope, while Hamas, if it is not entirely obliterated, may see defeat merely as a tactical setback.

One area in which Hamas is gradually succeeding is world opinion. However grisly, atrocious and vile the October 7 attack was, there are now pro-Palestinian, anti-Israel demonstrations around the world. They blend anti-Zionism, antisemitism, half-baked anti-colonial theories, and disingenuous and grossly irrelevant identity politics. In the United States, a new University of Maryland/IPSOS poll shows a significant decline in support for Israel among the younger age group since its military response in Gaza.

That is disturbing and objectionable, but that is not the point. Sympathy for the Palestinians, an Arab world that is rethinking and gradually retreating from normalization with Israel, a Global South that by and large identifies with the Palestinians and anti-American sentiment are exactly what Hamas – as well as Hezbollah and Iran – had hoped for. And Hamas already has allies such as Iran, Turkey and Russia.

This is its strategic objective, and whether Israel struck 14,000 or 15,000 targets, killed 2,000 or 3,000 gunmen and flattened entire blocks in Gaza is immaterial to that goal. The objective is to isolate Israel, draw attention to a bogus “genocide” and highlight its reliance on the United States, in an attempt to turn Israel from an asset into a liability for the Americans.
In an excellent and thought-provoking analysis, Jon Alterman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies points to two policies Israel needs to implement in the immediate and intermediate time frame in order to change the strategic trajectory: regain international legitimacy; and strengthen the Palestinian Authority.

The first involves heeding U.S. advice and increasing requests for humanitarian pauses and intermittent local cease-fires. There are also smart and creative ideas on how to deal with Gaza’s hospitals, amid growing criticism that Israel is not sparing them. Israel has rejected it all to this point, instead announcing that there will be no general cease-fire. The United States has also expressed opposition to the idea of a cease-fire that would leave Hamas in control in Gaza, but it is increasingly pressing Israel to consider humanitarian pauses.

The second, strengthening the PA, requires a dramatic shift in Israel’s political and strategic mind-set – one that may lead to a political process once a settlement in Gaza is extended to the West Bank.

The two are patently political and diplomatic courses, and therefore neither is possible as long as Israel is governed by the hubris of Benjamin “I am not responsible, no one warned me” Netanyahu and the band of messianic incompetent extremists he calls his government, and as long as the PA is inept, weak and unpopular.

Security is the prime moral imperative and political responsibility of any Israeli government. This government failed Israel on October 7. In order to negate Hamas’ strategy, a clear political objective and a new policy are required.
Mr. Netanyahu’s hyperbolic claims that he will “change the Middle East” require more than a successful military operation.