To Sea-Service professionals this subject is an obvious necessity. What is less apparent—but vitally important—is that others must also be taught the basics of this complex topic.
To the uninformed, naval strategy is often confused with tactics—the maneuvering of ships on a “chessboard without squares.” To those better in the know, it becomes more strategic, embracing the employment of naval units on the waters of the world to good military advantage during wartime. But in truth, naval strategy is much more complex and capable than even this more enlightened view allows.
A true understanding of naval strategy reveals that combat at sea is most accurately characterized as a last resort, the failure of sea power’s employment in the realm of grand strategy, where the full expanse of available means (diplomacy, information, military, economic—sometimes referred to as DIME) is used to achieve the nation’s aims. 1 The military component is included as a persuasive, rather than a kinetic, tool applied in terms of deterrence rather than as the application of force. In the realm of grand strategy, naval power lurks in the background (or in some cases the foreground) of international relations, providing the “steel” that makes policy and diplomacy credible and ensures the preservation of economic vitality. Employed effectively—through those familiar (but not always fully understood or appreciated) concepts of sea control, forward presence, and deterrence—naval power serves best when it prevents conflict, when it empowers the nation to achieve its policy goals without having to resort to conflict at sea or on land through power projection. For all of their martial appeal, Tomahawk cruise missiles, Alfa Strikes, and SEAL insertions are manifestations of the nation’s inability to achieve its objectives through more efficient—and often more effective—means.
This is not to say that sea power is a form of pacifism or that naval forces need only be equipped to show the flag or to threaten; for those applications of soft power to work, they must be backed up by real combat power that once employed must be capable of inflicting necessary harm to not only achieve the desired immediate effects but give pause to future challengers of the nation’s strategic goals.
The proper use of naval power across this strategic spectrum is the substance of naval strategy, the art and science of applying logic and a degree of prescience to solving problems that confront those entrusted with the nation’s interests in the international arena. Policymakers who understand this, who view sea power as one of the primary instruments of their craft, are better prepared to achieve their desired results. Naval professionals who likewise understand their roles as subservient to broader national interests, as elements of strategy rather than as purveyors of naval power for its own sake, are well positioned to serve the nation’s interests and to faithfully carry out those oaths of office that presaged their current employment.
Teaching and Learning
Because naval power is multifaceted in its capabilities, and naval strategy must embrace various means for its employment, the study of this complex subject can be challenging, often perplexing. Ways of overcoming this complexity must be employed to teach neophytes and to substantively empower those who are tasked as policymakers and/or implementers of strategy.
Naval strategy is rightfully taught and explored at the Naval War College, and this author has had the honor and rather daunting responsibility of teaching the college’s “Strategy and War” course for more than two decades. Over the years, the students, particularly those in military service, often come to the course looking for “the gouge,” a checklist of things to do to win wars. This is understandable, given the military training culture, where checklists are effectively used to accomplish seemingly miraculous things, such as bringing a giant warship safely into harbor or harnessing the power of the atom. In most of their endeavors, military people tend to be more scientists than artists or philosophers. We use spherical trigonometry to navigate, physics (ballistics) to deliver firepower, thermodynamics to accomplish propulsion, and electronics to communicate, reconnoiter, etc. All of these are exact sciences with predictable outcomes. But the granddaddy of all those endeavors is war itself, with its major components of strategy, operations, and tactics. While there is a substantial amount of science in tactics and operations, strategy is less cooperative.
Those who have studied and/or experienced war and learned its hard lessons are very much aware that strategy is far too complex to yield to the simplicity and predictability of a checklist. So to serve as an antidote to this checklist mentality, the War College employs a combination of theoretical readings and relevant case studies, the former serving to take the students out of the laboratory and into the lyceum where philosophy replaces scientific method, and the latter providing real-world opportunities to test the theories offered by philosophers of war. 2
At the risk of being dismissed as a biased participant rather than an objective observer, I will nonetheless assert that the Naval War College is successful in this endeavor, that the corpus of assessment (student critiques, Navy inspections, academic accreditations, etc.) strongly indicates that naval strategy is being successfully taught on the shores of Narragansett Bay and in many adjunct locations—including cyberspace—by the NWC College of Distance Education.
Beyond Professionalism
But teaching strategy to naval professionals is only a partial solution to a much larger problem, one that must be solved less by professors and more by public-affairs specialists.
Unfortunately, there currently is no vehicle for teaching naval strategy to civilian policymakers. Coming as they do to their various offices from different walks of life through elections and appointments, there is no practical way to send them to a war college or an equivalent. But a partial solution can be derived if we first acknowledge that in America national power resides in the people.
Most Americans—if they think about their navy at all—perceive it as expensive (true) and no longer as necessary as it once was (decidedly not true). Like it or not, through the power of the purse strings, those citizens and their legislative representatives hold the keys to the nation’s security. If the Navy is going to continue to carry out those missions so essential to a maritime nation such as ours, those missions have to be explained so that the citizenry understands what the Navy does and what it must be prepared to do.
There is evidence that the Navy’s leadership understands this necessity, because the most recent iteration of strategy ( A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower —more familiarly known as “The Maritime Strategy”) is presented not only as a guiding document for professionals but as a form of advertisement for the Sea Services as well. A centerpiece of that document is the identification and explanation of Sea-Service missions, called “core capabilities.” While these six capabilities—forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, and humanitarian assistance/disaster response—are explained effectively in the Maritime Strategy, that document has never been on The New York Times bestseller list. More must be done . . . much more. 3
We must find ways to educate the American people (and their congressional representatives whence they come) who are ultimately paying for these expensive naval forces. We must come down from the naval pulpit and use other means to spread the gospel of naval strategy so that taxpayers and lawmakers understand and appreciate those core capabilities. This is much easier said than done, because for all their importance these capabilities are not intuitively obvious. Each requires at least some explanation to place them in their proper (maritime) context.
Less Tangible—No Less Important
In addition to the problem of mission opacity, there is another less obvious reason for the underappreciation of the importance of the nation’s Navy, one that is ironically caused to a large degree by the incredible success of the Navy in the middle of the last century. The great victory at sea of World War II, where American sailors fought and won many awe-inspiring battles—some of them gargantuan in scope—elevated the U.S. Navy’s status in the eyes of its citizens to unprecedented heights. And while that status was richly deserved and should never be forgotten, it has had the converse effect of setting a very high bar for future naval operations in terms of public perception. One can look to the battles of Midway, Leyte Gulf, and Okinawa and see the tangible results of sunken ships, captured islands, and an ultimate surrender ceremony on the deck of a battleship. But one must rely on much less tangible “proofs” when trying to visualize such things as “forward presence” or “sea control.”
The conflicts that followed World War II—the Cold War power plays in Korea and Vietnam, the various clashes in the Middle East, etc.—would not have even been possible without the continued dominance of American sea power, yet the absence of great sea battles in those conflicts promotes a popular (but deficient) image of a Navy that is only peripherally involved at best, and superfluous at worst.
In his August 2014 Proceedings article “ Why 1914 Still Matters ,” Dr. Norman Friedman explains another aspect of the Navy’s image problem by pointing out that even though World War I was largely a maritime conflict, that aspect is overshadowed by images of trench warfare. He concludes by observing that “we are the world’s largest trading nation, and we live largely by international trade—much of which has to go by sea.” He laments that “relatively few Americans understand as much, or see what happens in the Far East as central to their own prosperity.”4 It is fair to assert that few shoppers at Walmart or Target ever stop to consider that the plethora of products they find on those rows and rows of shelves are there partly because the Navy is doing its job, keeping the sea lanes of trade open 24/7/365.
These problems are exacerbated by our recent history. We have been at war for more than a decade, a fact that is recognized (if not internalized) by the American people. But the imagery of that combat is dominated by soldiers, Marines, and SEALs. While this is certainly valid imagery in its own right, it has the unfortunate side effect of masking the other essential components of our national defense and further promotes the misleading and erroneous conclusion that the Navy may no longer be indispensable.
Solutions
The Navy has long relied on its public-affairs specialists to promote the service to the outside world. While a significant portion of that effort is understandably and necessarily geared toward recruitment, that exertion should be heavily supplemented—indeed superseded—by a focus on educating the public regarding those missions that are so elemental to maritime power (and survival) yet are so little understood and greatly undervalued.
A current Navy public-affairs television message succinctly states the problem (at least a portion of it) and the solution. It begins with an overhead view of the ocean with the words “70% of the world is covered by water” superimposed on the surface below; those words fade and are replaced by “80% of all people live near water;” then, “90% of all trade travels by water;” the words fade again, but this time the powerful image of a bustling flight deck of an aircraft carrier moves across the screen, followed by the words “100% on watch” in its wake.
That short but powerful ad is a masterpiece, showing what good public-affairs talent can do. But it only scratches the surface of the deeper problem, a great first step that should serve as the vanguard of an effective and sustainable campaign that will edify and inspire.
We must find ways to illustrate the concepts of “forward presence” and “deterrence” just as that masterpiece ad conveys the concepts of sea control and maritime security. Such messaging is potent in its subtlety and its simplicity, but we should also rely on concrete examples that show the Navy doing what it does so effectively.
Just a few of the countless examples of naval power wielded in ways that do not make good subjects for action movies yet are essential to the nation’s ability to maintain its security and to influence world affairs are:
• The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 (when a naval quarantine coupled with credible deterrence enhanced our maritime security, while preventing a third world war in a time of perceived superpower parity). 5
• The Jordanian Crisis of 1970 (where forward presence was the key to achieving important strategic goals, including the preservation of an important Middle Eastern ally). 6
• The Yom Kippur War of 1973 (when the U.S. Navy played a key role in the preservation of Israel and in reducing the influence of the Soviet Union in that region). 7
The absence of explosive imagery in such situations makes the task of edification difficult but not impossible. The kind of talent that created the aforementioned TV ad is most likely up to that challenge.
Some excellent television ads also highlight the core capabilities of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. These are important missions and should be recognized and valued, but they must be balanced by messages depicting the Navy’s other strategic missions, lest they distort rather than enhance the overall perception of the broad body of naval capability and importance.
We must also make it very clear that when those other elements of naval strategy fail, when force becomes the medium of exchange, our Navy is ready and able to deliver, effectively and decisively. We should do this by reminding the nation of select instances when power was projected, such as the air strikes against the Taliban and al Qaeda in the wake of 9/11. 8 Another would be the short, one-sided naval battle against the Iranians in October 1987 (which could also serve to remind the Iranians!). 9 If the latter sounds like lobbying for naval history, guilty as charged. But let it be clear that these are means to an end, not an end in itself. Our Navy’s history is an underused tool that can be deployed effectively toward this important goal. We enjoy an impressive history of achievements—both in war and in peace—that we barely embrace ourselves, much less use to educate those who ultimately hold the fiscal keys to our effectiveness.
Successful politicians have learned that popular television can be a powerful supplement to news coverage and to political ads. They have learned that they can connect with the American people in a powerful way by making appearances on late-night talk shows and the like. Such exchanges can go a long way toward popularizing issues that were previously constrained by the brevity and formality of traditional news, and they can humanize the messengers in ways campaign ads often fail to do. Significant efforts should be made to find ways for the Chief of Naval Operations and/or other high-ranking entities to appear on television where they can deliver these important messages in a conversational manner. There are risks, to be sure, but risk averseness is not an attribute to stand alongside such things as honor, courage, and commitment.
Often the messenger is as important as the message. We should attempt first to educate and then enlist the assistance of celebrities or people with natural credibility. The American public will listen to the likes of actors Tom Hanks and Sandra Bullock if they can be persuaded to promote this important message. If Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos would publicly acknowledge that his economic colossus depends on overseas trade for materials and foreign markets, the concepts of sea control and maritime security could be more easily understood and appreciated. The right spokespeople, who are recognized as important in their own realms yet can speak as citizens who “get it,” could have a significant impact.
Social media have proved their potential potency in troubled parts of the world, serving as game-changers in ways that a short time before no one saw coming. 10 We must also make better use of such tools as Facebook and Twitter as other means to these worthwhile ends.
All of these efforts do not have to function exclusively for the Navy. A joint effort among the armed services could be even more effective, as long as no one service is allowed to dominate, and the Navy is presented as an equally essential partner in the grand scheme of national defense. A “purple” approach could defuse charges of parochialism and potentially benefit from pooled resources.
Teaching All Who Matter
The Navy has proved that it can teach naval strategy to naval professionals, and that is of course a very good thing. But if we are going to be able to maintain the capabilities of the nation’s navy, to keep this maritime nation safe and prosperous, we must ensure that those who control the purse strings understand why they are spending precious treasure on something they vitally need but rarely see. We must acknowledge this edification process as a very high priority and expend the necessary effort and resources to develop a carefully balanced, multifaceted campaign that explains all that the Navy provides and must be ready to provide to a people who are currently only vaguely aware of its existence and even less cognizant of its purpose.
If successful, the American people will be able to grasp the basic but somewhat elusive elements of naval strategy so that they can make informed decisions about the spending of their money and, by extension, policymakers will be better equipped to make use of the capabilities that navies provide. People rarely purchase things they cannot see or understand, so it is imperative that we use the tools we have—a proven track record and a genuine raison d’etre—to “sell” this vital product.
Strange as it may seem, we must teach naval strategy to the public .
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-03/teaching-naval-strategy%E2%80%94-all-who-matter
From a recent U.S. Navy Recruiting commercial, one can learn that:
By those three points one should be able to grasp that our ability to influence what happens on the world's seas is critical to our nation, and the peace of the world.
This article is intended to be informative for those not well studied in naval history, or the current mission of the Navy and Marine Corps.
The link is protected and can't be accessed.
Just to add to seapower, the U.S. DOES NOT own a single International Shipping Line. The last one was sold to NOL, owned by the Singapore government. (currently being sold to CGM, a private French company)
IMO this is really backward thinking by the U.S. Yes, we have agreements that certain foreign lines will provide heavy lift when needed by the U.S. I would much rather depend on our capabilities than depending on another country capabilities.
Thanks for this article, Fly... I look forward to seeing more!
Best to you today Kavika....
Military Sealift Command has taken a beating over the last two decades that is for sure. Lets hope we don't need them. Most activities I see in the near future are going to be "come as you are affairs".
The Athenian general and politician of 524–459 BC stated that "He who contols the seas, controls everything." His words are as true today as they were 2,500 years ago.
In 2016 it is necessary to refine his statement in that you need to control the air, space, and the underseas of those same seas.
As the daughter of a Navy man, I was well aware of this Fly. Sadly most people are not. The last movie I can remember that featured the Navy, was "Midway"... although you will be glad to know that there is a TV series here called "The Last Ship" that features a great Navy Captain and his crew. And last week, I actually saw on the news a carrier showing their proficiency at prepping fighters for their sorties.
You are correct that most people don't think of the Navy. They also don't think about the Coast Guard either.. or if they do, they think of them as search and rescue. Meanwhile, here on the homefront, they are our first line of defence against drug trade, piracy and illegal immigration. These two facets of our armed forces serve quietly and efficiently, so the public is unaware of their great benefit.
Great Article!
The Coast Guard, affectionately know as ''The Puddle Pirates''....
Kidding, the Coast Guard are a darn good bunch. Many of the operators of the landing craft in WWII were Coast Guard, as well in the Mekong Delta during Vietnam.
You should see all the bitching on my submariner based FB pages about how the Navy is being gutted while the Chinese are building a lot of very capable submarines. We need more and better outfitted nuclear subs. We need more support vessels.
I know the bitching quite well Wheel, and it is well deserved.
With the Arctic thawing out, there is going to be more and more navigable seas to patrol, and both the Chinese and Russians are building ever more quiet submarines to operate in those seas. Back during the Cold War, we and our allies were the "A-Team" when it came to controlling how the ASW game was played. We don't dare lose that edge, but I think we have lost some of those perishable human skills that made us the best. Equipment only goes so far.
Think of how many attack subs could have been built for what we have paid for the stinking F-35.
Wheel, you fuckin Nuke! Which page is that?
cold war submariners in particular. The others are more social, that one is more political
"while the Chinese are building a lot of very capable submarines."
True. But there is some positive news too, with our greatest ally, Israel. Israel is working on growing its sub program.
From the JPost:
Yep. Israel has purchased a number of a modified German Type-209 DE submarines. Very quiet, and very capable for Israels neck of the woods. If it came to it, they would be operating against Russian built Kilo class DEs. Both are pretty evenly matched in sensor capability, quiet operation, an weaponry. If it came to blows, the difference will be determined by the crews manning them.
The Aussies are ordering 12 of the most advanced subs in the world, from France.
Interesting link for you submariners, with video. A stealth sub.
A political decision that is severely straining Australian-Japanese relations.
The Japanese lost out to the French on the purchase. The Soryu sub of the Japanese is getting a lot of competition, France and Germany are producing the competition to the Soryu.
Aren't all decision political, Cerenkov?
Yes, the Japanese felt that they had a ''wink and nod'' for Australia to purchase their subs, they didn't have a signed contract.
South Korea is also upset with the Aussies, since they thought that they were to supply a number of surface ships, and instead Spain got the contract.
Changes in administrations can, and often do create problems because of prior verbal commitments made. The bottom line is that a signed contract is needed to complete the deal.
I don't disagree, but the damage has been done nonetheless.
I guess it will depend on how aggressive the Chinese become. That is the common link for the Aussie's and the Japanese to remain allies.
I'm still hunting for the Red October.
Fly,
First, thanks for a really great subject and article. The import cannot be over emphasized as most Americans are truly uninformed/ignorant about the consequence of not being aware.
Secondly, my Father who is a Navy Vet, who spent his time as a very young man at sea stationed at bay in Cuba in the early sixties on a carrier, so appreciated your viewpoint. I only get to visit with him and mom about a month or so a year, mostly when they come and spend a few weeks wth us each summer. They always come over the fourth , when it's warm and gorgeous in northern minnesota; so, they are here visiting now. I read this article and the comments to him to get his perspective (he's a hardcore ol' school dude fly) and he got fairly serious and said ... *quoting* ...
"My concern is that the many, many sacrifices that have been made, may have to be made again if voting Americans don't understand how important sea travel really, truly is. War is so terrible and my Dad went to war and died Larry: I just hope we make wise decisions that do not lead again to another war".
...makes sense to me.
Perhaps the financial incentive isn't apparent; however, shouldn't there be a balance of National security interests/security to outweigh the cost of running our own international waters shipping lines? I mean, I really don't get it!?
however, shouldn't there be a balance of National security interests/security to outweigh the cost of running our own international waters shipping lines?
Isn't this what free trade is suppose to be about? This is one of the cornerstones for any maritime country. You need to ensure your access to commerce/shipping by sea, while if need be, be able to restrict it to a potential foe when the time comes. We've had a knife at the throat of China's economy through the Straights of Malacca for decades. A single sub, or even a destroyer could bring their their economy to it's knees in just a couple of months. They know it, we know it, and all these efforts by China to secure their access to the East and South China seas is targeted at eliminating that knife.
Right on.
A rudimentary understanding of the initial development of the US navy was in the spirit of that very thing.
Today we attempt to gain political advantage through the economics of such trade, (which if was purely shared by all would be fantastic!) Yet, I fear that that, isn't the case as we are now presently making actual strategic decisions with a smaller scope of choices. Perhaps the Feds need to step in and insure our own lines, and provide such protection. I know that means stepping on free enterprise, but totally necessary!
Totally imho.
initial development of the US navy
Your link is what power projection and maintaining the freedom of the seas is all about. What was true then is as true now as ever.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague will rule on a case brought by the Philippines against China over its territorial claims and actions across the disputed waters and vital global trade route.
This ruling is going to go against China which is a signatory to the United Nations maritime convention. China is going to ignore the conventions ruling. So either the rule of law, or might makes right is going to be the way things go. This makes that part of the world a flashpoint, which few are watching, or even know about. The US and our regional allies HAVE to respond forcefully now! We won't get a second chance. China has invested quite a bit there, so they are not going to want to back down, or worse have the "appearance" of having backed down. (It's that face saving face thing that is going to cause real problems.)
Think it is just a coincidence that there are two carrier battle groups in the area just prior to the court ruling? We haven't had two carrier groups operating jointly in that area since 1983!!!
This article was written in a scholarly and intellectual fashion. I found it interesting that the word fear is suggested but not used. To see a U.S. Naval vessel off shore and knowing its capabilities, I think, would instill some degree of fear.
I still think we never should have given up control of the Panama Canal. The gate keeper wields a lot of power whether during peace time or in times of war.
Thanks, Flynavy1, for posting this article. We hear all the time about "boots on the ground", but never hear about "paddles in the water". We take the Navy for granted.
Glad you enjoyed the article.... To your point about "Fear".
I think Oliver Cromwell's statement about "A man of war is the best ambassador." points to what you were getting at. That warship can be your ally or your foe. It is up to those looking at it to decide which it will be.
Again, the real fun begins on 12JUL16, when the Maritime Convention rules against what China has been doing in the region, and China, a signatory to the international convention ignores their ruling.
Happy 4th!